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THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN AT-WILL
EMPLOYMENT AND ToRTIous INTERFERENCE

WITH BusINEss RELATIONS: Rethinking

Tortious Interference Claims in the
Employment Context
Alex Long*

I. INTRODUCTION
For employment law practitioners, the modem version of the employment
at-will rule is a relatively easy concept to grasp. Employers are free to
discharge employees for any reason, so long as that reason does not offend
public policy.' Despite lawyers' ease with the rule, misconceptions about the
rule may still be prevalent among employees themselves. In a 1997 law
review article, Pauline T. Kim reported that 89% of respondents to her
survey, conducted to test employees' knowledge of the employment at-will
rule, believed that the law forbids a termination based on personal dislike.'
Kim refers to the respondents' belief as erroneous,3 which is technically
accurate-under the employment at-will rule, employers are free to discharge
an employee out of personal dislike. In reality, however, employees who
hold such a belief may not be as mistaken as most attorneys would
automatically think. As this Article explains, a discharge based on personal
dislike may indeed be unlawful, even if that dislike is not based on race,
gender, or some other protected characteristic. The outcome simply depends
on who one defines as "the employer" and how strong the dislike is.
For example, IBM is not capable of discharging an employee out of
personal dislike. IBM is a corporation, not a person. As such, it is
incapable of liking or disliking anyone. Similarly, questions as to hiring and
Lecturer, West Virginia University College of Law.
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1.
Cynthia L. Estlund, The Changing Workplace: Wrongful Discharge Protections in an AtWill World, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1655, 1664-65 (1996).
2.
Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions
of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 133-34 (1997).
3.
Id. at 110.
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firing, although nominally made by IBM, are, in reality left to individuals
within the corporation. If an IBM employee is fired out of personal dislike,
then the decision to fire and the personal dislike must come from an
individual, usually a supervisor or officer. Although Kim is absolutely
correct that the employment at-will rule prevents an employee from
successfully suing IBM over such a discharge, the rule does little to stop the
employee from suing the supervisor or officer. Of course, run-of-the-mill
"dislike" is hardly a strong basis upon which to bring any legal claim against
anyone. However, if the "dislike" can be characterized as "personal
hostility," "ill will," or some other reasonable synonym, and the at-will
employee can show that such feelings were the sole motivation behind the
discharge, then, according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts (hereinafter
such a discharge "is almost certain to be held"
"Second Restatement"),
4
unlawful.
The legal theory on which such a claim could be founded is tortious
interference with prospective contractual relations (also known as tortious
interference with business relations), and it is a claim that is frequently used
in the employment setting in an attempt to hold individual supervisors and
officers liable for discharges which, although legal for "employers," are
illegal for the agents of employers. Under an interference theory, an outsider
to an at-will relationship may be held liable for an improper or unjustified
interference that causes one of the parties not to continue the relationship.5
Numerous courts have held that supervisors or officers who act for reasons
apart from benefitting their employers in discharging an employee may be
considered such outsiders and may be held liable.6 As a result, tortious
interference claims have emerged as a valuable tool in escaping some of the
restrictions of the employment at-will rule.
Although some critics of the at-will rule might applaud any tool that helps
alleviate the perceived unfairness in the rule, tortious interference claims in
the employment setting raise some serious concerns. For one, as the authors
of the Second Restatement noted, because the evaluation of whether an
interference is improper involves a balancing of a variety of factors and
depends on the particular circumstances of a case, the determination that an
interference was improper in one case is usually not controlling in another."
As a result, employers and employees are often left with little to go on in

4.
5.
6.
7.

TORTS § 767 cnt. d (1977).
Id. §§ 766 cmt. g, 766B.
See infra notes 69-70 (citing examples).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. b (1977).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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evaluating whether a discharge was "improper" under the facts of a
particular case.
Perhaps more importantly, the insertion of interference claims into the
w~rkplace tends to undermine the employment at-will default rule. In the
modem workplace, it is difficult to state for certain just where an
"employer" ends and a "supervisor" begins. Gone are the days when an
employer was often a sole proprietor. Instead, in the words of one court,
"[t]he employer in the old sense has been replaced by a superior in the
corporate hierarchy who is himself an employee."' Although it is still true
that an employer may fire an employee for nearly any reason, the impetus
behind the discharge must come from a superior. If the reason behind the
discharge is "improper," but not otherwise actionable under a wrongful
discharge theory, then the employer may not be liable by virtue of the at-will
rule, but the individual who made the decision may be under the interference
tort. The result is a blurring of the line between wrongful discharge law and
tortious interference law and an overall weakening of the employment at-will
rule.
This Article addresses some of the problems that tortious interference
claims may present under existing wrongful discharge law. Part II provides
a background as to how tortious interference claims operate in the generic
sense, as well as in the employment setting. Part III focuses specifically on
such claims in the workplace. It analyzes the ways in which such claims are
frequently brought against officers and supervisors as an alternative to
wrongful discharge claims against employers. In addition, it focuses on the
difficulty courts have had in creating a consistent framework of analysis for
such claims. Part IV takes a somewhat formalistic approach to the
relationship between the employment at-will rule and tortious interference
claims in the workplace. Specifically, it discusses the arguments in favor of
and in opposition to the employment at-will rule as a whole and how that rule
may be weakened by judicial treatment of interference claims in employment
at-will settings. To the extent possible, Part V proposes a rough means of
closing the disconnect that currently exists between wrongful discharge law
and tortious interference claims. By its nature, tortious interference with
business relations is an amorphous tort, incapable of precise deirmition. As
such, it is difficult to craft clear guidelines for the treatment of such claims.
However, this Article suggests that courts can and should attempt to
minimize the imposition that interference claims can have on the at-will rule.
Specifically, by the simple act of recognizing that interference claims can
weaken the at-will rule, courts may be more vigilant about drawing
8.

Pierce v. Ortho Pharn. Corp., 417 A.2d 505. 509 (N.J. 1980).

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

appropriate lines in interference cases to prevent the weakening of this

default rule. Once courts take this step, they can formulate a test which
takes the emphasis off the mental state of officers and supervisors and instead
places the emphasis in interference cases on whether the interference was

independently wrongful.

II. INTERFERENCE WrTH BUSINESS RELATIONS CLAIMS IN THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT

A. Tortious Interference with Business Relations
According to the authors of the Second Restatement, the claim of tortious
interference with business relations has historical roots dating back to at least
the fifteenth century. 9 The precedent relied upon by the authors involves
situations in which an actor wrongfully interfered not with an existing
contract, but rather simple business expectancies, such as the ability to
engage in trade with another.' 0 Despite what the authors perceive as the
historical justification for the tort of interference with business relations, it
was the tort's more well-known cousin, interference with contractual
relations, that first gained a solid foothold in modem tort law. Courts and
commentators were slower to accept interference with mere prospective
contractual relations or business relations as a viable cause of action, often
on the grounds that one possesses a property-like right in a contract not
present in other types of business relations." By the time of the enactment of
the Restatement of Torts (hereinafter "First Restatement"), proponents had
carried the day. The First Restatement advocated a prohibition against an
unprivileged interference with both existing contracts and prospective or
existing business relations not reduced to contract form.'"
The Second Restatement created a more formal distinction between
interference with existing contracts and interference with business relations,

9.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B cnt. b (1977).

10.
11.

Id.
Mark P. Gergen, Tordous Interference: How it is Engulfing Commercial Law, Why This

Is Not Entirely Bad, and a Prudential Response, 38 ARiz. L. REv. 1175, 1213-18 (chronicling the
historical development of the tort of interference with business relations).
12. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1939).
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classifying them as separate actions.' 3 The main difference in the
formulation of the tort between the First Restatement and the Second
Restatement is in the elimination of the concept of privilege. Under the First
Restatement, "one who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise
purposely causes a third person not to... enter into or continue a business
relation with another" may be held liable for damages."' Under the Second
Restatement, the concept of privilege is somewhat softened: "one who
intentionally and improperly interferes with another's" business relations may
be held liable.'" The tort of interference with contractual relations employs
the same basic framework, but prohibits improper interference with existing
contracts, rather than mere business relations.' 6 The authors of the Second
Restatement chose not to use the privilege concept because they felt that
interference law had not "developed a crystallized set of definite rules as to
the existence or non-existence of a privilege" to interfere. 7 The authors also
rejected the term "unjustified" because, in part, they felt it was too closely
associated with the idea of an affirmative defense.'" As such, the authors
believed that "improper" was a more neutral term which better captured the
myriad factors that may be involved in assessing whether an interference
should be actionable in a given situation. 9 Despite the insertion of the word
"improperly" for "without a privilege" in the Second Restatement, the
analysis of an interference claim remains similar.' Because, in most cases,
an "improper" interference will also typically be an "unprivileged" one, the
behavior 2 or motives of the interfering party will almost always be in
question. 21
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766, 766B (1977). Despite the distinction, many
courts continue to treat the two torts as one and the same. Gergen, supra note 11, at 1180-81.
14. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766(b) (1939).
15.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1977) (emphasis added).

16. Id. §766.
17. Id. § 767 cmt. b.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 766B cmt. b. In the comments, the authors compare the evaluation of whether an
interference is improper with the assessment of whether conduct is negligent - both are fact-specific
and the outcome of one case is not usually controlling on the next. Id. Although the authors noted
that the factors to be considered in making this assessment reflect, to some extent, generalized
privileges which had developed through judicial decisions, there still existed "ambiguity" as to the
scope of these privileges. Id. Thus, the implication is that the better approach would be to
conduct a balancing of interests based upon all of the surrounding circumstances to assess whether a
defendant may be held liable for interfering in the relations of others.
20. See Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. 1991)
("Interference is improper, we might say, if it is without legal justification."); Four Nines Gold,
Inc. v. 71 Constr., Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 245 (Wyo. 1991) (Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting) (referring to
justification, privilege, and "not improper" as "all being the same concept").
21. Gergen, supra note 11, at 1197 n.116.
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Section 767 of the Second Restatement lists the factors to consider in
assessing whether a defendant's interference with a contract or a prospective
contractual relation is improper:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct
interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the societal interests in protecting the freedom of action
of the actor and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the
interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.'
The authors recommended that each factor be taken into consideration and
weighed against each other in making the determination as to the impropriety
of the defendant's conduct.'
Although the Second Restatement authors believed they were making an
improvement by substituting the term "improperly" for "unprivileged," the
impropriety standard has met with considerable disfavor.
Some
commentators and courts have argued that the tort, as a whole, lacks
doctrinal clarity and that the impropriety standard only exacerbates the
confusion.'
The chief complaint is that section 767's balancing-of-factors
22.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1977).
23. Id. § 767 cmt. a.
24. Ran Corp. v. Hudesman, 823 P.2d 646, 648 (Alaska 1991) (stating that the factors listed
in section 767 "are hard to apply in any sort of predictive way"); Kutcher v. Zimmerman, 957 P.2d
1076, 1088-89 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to accept the seven-factor analysis of section 767
and noting the criticism that the test is "unpredictable and does not clearly delineate burdens of
pleading and proof"); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 303-04 (Utah 1982)
("In short, there is no generally acknowledged or satisfactory majority position on the definition of

the elements of the tort of intentional interference with prospective contractual economic
relations."); Gergen, supra note 11, at 1184 ("Courts struggle with this issue of [improper
interference] because the law of interference, and tort law more generally, provides little assistance

in setting limits on the tort."); Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition
in Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (1993) ("tortious
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approach provides little guidance from case to case as to what behavior may
be deemed improper. For example, Prosser states that the standards that
have developed ii assessing impropriety have not clearly outlawed any
specific action, "leaving a rather broad and undefined tort in which no
specific conduct is proscribed and in which liability turns on the purpose for
which the defendant acts, with the indistinct notion that the purposes must be
considered improper in some undefined way."' Although the question of
motive would naturally seem to play a large role in assessing whether a
defendant's actions are improper, the comments to section 767 make plain
that motive is but one factor to be weighed against the others. Although the
defendant's motive may be "very important," the desire to interfere need not
be the sole or even the primary motive in order for an interference to be
improper.' Even if the desire to interfere is only a "casual motive it may
still be significant in some circumstances." 2 7 However, where the means
used to accomplish the interference are innocent, some showing of a desire to
accomplish the interference may be essential to succeed on an interference
clain.s
In addition, assessment of whether an interference is improper also
involves consideration of a host of other factors. Where the interfering party
enjoys a close relationship with the breaching party or the party who ends the
business relationship with the plaintiff, this fact cuts against a finding that the
interference was improper.29 Interference with a plaintiffs formal, existing
contract is entitled to more protection than is an interference with a
prospective contract or a business relation.' Consideration of whether an
interference law suffers from considerable doctrinal confusion."); Harvey S. Perlman, Interference
with Contract and Other Economic E pectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Princles, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 61, 61 (1982) ("Today, courts impose liability under the rubric of the interference
tort in a variety of contexts, but they have failed to develop common or consistent doctrines.").
Other commentators have criticized the tort for its effect on other areas of the law. Myers, supra, at
1109; Gary D. Wexler, Note and Comment, Intentional Interference with Contract: Market
Efficiency and Individual Liberty Considerations, 27 CONN. L. REV. 279, 281-82 (1994) (criticizing
the tort's impact on, inter alia, market efficiency, and fundamental constitutional rights).
25. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 129, at 979
(5th ed. 1984). See also Benjamin L. Fine, Comment, An Analysis of the Formation of Property
Rights Underlying Tortious Interference with Contracts and Other Economic Relations, 50 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1116, 1116 n.9 (discussing the uncertainty in the area of "the proper scope of defense of
privilege or justification"); Myers, supra note 24, at 1133-35 (discussing the ambiguities inherent in
the motive inquiry and the problems they bring about); Wexler, supra note 24, at 295 ("Every case
turns out to be essentially an ad hoc determination ... .").
26.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. d (1977).

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 767 cmt. i.
Id. § 767 cmt. e.
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interference is improper also requires looking at the means used to
accomplish the interference in conjunction with the other factors listed.
Thus, the resort to physical violence might be enough to render an
interference improper in one set of circumstances, but not another,
depending upon, inter alia, the relations between the parties and the nature
of the interest affected." This tension between a defendant's mental state,
the plaintiff's interests, the defendant's interests, the relationship between the
parties, the means used, and societal interests will usually32render the question
of whether an interference was improper a jury question.
Compounding the confusion is the fact that courts have failed to develop a
unified approach in dealing with the allegedly wrongful behavior of
defendants. Despite the development of the impropriety standard reflected in
the Second Restatement, many courts continue to rely upon the old notions of
privilege and justification."
For example, in the employment context,
numerous opinions refer to the "manager's privilege" to take or recommend
adverse actions against employees, rather than assessing whether the
manager's actions were improper.3
Although the two concepts are
unquestionably similar, the authors of the Second Restatement chose to
replace "without a privilege" with "improperly" due in part to what they
perceived as the ambiguity inherent in assessing the scope of the privilege to
interfere.35
Other courts ostensibly follow the Second Restatement approach in
determining whether an interference was improper, but make little attempt to

31. Id. § 767 cmt. c.
32. See, e.g., Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Howton, 603 P.2d 402, 405 (Wyo. 1979); Holly
M. Poglase, Handling the Intentional Interference with Employment Contract Case, FOR THE
DEFENSE 8, 8 (Nov. 1995).
33. See Stebbins & Roberts, Inc. v. Halsey, 582 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ark. 1979); Turner v.
Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1115-16 (Kan. 1986); Luketich v. Goedecke Wood & Co., 835
S.W.2d 504, 508 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102-04 (Va. 1985);
Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 506 S.E.2d 578, 592 (W. Va. 1998).
34. Halvorsen v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383, 390 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (recognizing an absolute "manager's privilege" to interfere); Sait v. Ruden, McClosky,
Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So. 2d 381, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing a
qualified "'privilege to interfere' enjoyed by an officer or employee of a contracting party");
Clement v. Rev-Lyn Contracting Co., 663 N.E.2d 1235, 1237 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (recognizing
supervisor's privilege to interfere); Nix v. Temple Univ., 596 A.2d 1132, 1137 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) (stating that managerial employees are "permitted to take actions which would have the effect
of interfering with a contractual relationship between the corporation and an employee"); see aLso
Meyer v. Enoch, 807 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Mo. App. Ct. 1991) (referring to a corporate officer's
privilege "to induce a breach of a corporate contract").
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. b (1977).
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conduct the balancing test advocated by section 767. 3' In other words, these
courts claim to assess whether the defendant's behavior was improper, but
fail to weigh the factors listed in section 767 against each other as the authors
of the Second Restatement specifically intended.37 Again, the result of this
lack of a unified approach is to create uncertainty in a highly fact-specific
tort that already suffers from a lack of certainty.
B. The Utility of Tortious Interference Claims in the Employment Setting
The law of wrongfd discharge is like a fleet of vessels,
varying in size and seaworthiness, that must travel over the
stormy sea of employment at will.3"
Of all the collateral torts that are frequently asserted in employment cases,
perhaps none fits as nicely for plaintiffs into existing employment law
paradigms as interference with business relations. Interference with business
relations may prove in some instances to be the most natural, and indeed, the
only logical alternative basis for -recovery when the stormy seas of the
employment at-will doctrine and statutory discrimination laws make recovery
against the employer impossible. At least one court has expressed the view

that wrongful discharge claims are simply a more particularized form of a
tortious interference claim.39 Other courts have gone further, suggesting that
if left unchecked, interference claims have the potential to eliminate the
employment at-will doctrine altogether.'
Several factors make interference claims potentially useful in employment
litigation. The first is the fact that the at-will status of an employee is not a
bar to an action. The Second Restatement provides that a contract terminable
36. See, e.g., Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, 565 A.2d 285, 290-92 (D.C. 1989) (listing the factors
contained in section 767, but considering the case in terms of whether the interference was justified
and considering only the defendant's motive in reaching its determination).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. b ("This Section states the important
factors to be weighed against each other and balanced in arriving at judgment ...
.
38. Estlund, supra note 1, at 1657.
39. Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. Standard Pump-Aldrich Div., 422 A.2d 611, 618 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980).
40. Clement v. Rev-Lyn Contracting Co., 663 N.E.2d 1235, 1236 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct.
1996) (stating in the context of an interference claim that "what is at stake is the risk of converting
the existing rule regarding at-will employees into a rule requiring just cause for terminating such
employees); see also Halvorsen v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383, 390 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (stating that by providing an absolute privilege to managers to interfere with the
business relation between the corporation and the employee, "[plaintiffs are also precluded from
pleading around at will employment contracts by challenging the motives of management, which, in
effect, would require management, that is, the employer, to have good cause to terminate.").
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at-will is nonetheless a "valid and subsisting" contract until terminated. 41
Thus, interference with a contract of employment terminable at-will may be
actionable under an interference with contractual relations theory. In
addition, the Second Restatement also provides that interference with' a
continuing business or other customary relationship not amounting to a
formal contract may be actionable under an interference with business
relations theory.42 Therefore, under the Second Restatement, the at-will
status of an employee is not necessarily a bar to an interference claim-a
court can treat an employment at-will relationship as either an interference
with a contractual relation or an interference with a business relation. Most
states to consider these issues are in agreement with the Second
Restatement's position. 43 As discussed infra, courts are often less than clear
as to whether such claims should be characterized as interference with
contractual relations or interference with prospective contractual relations or
business relations." Some courts refer to employment at-will relationships
as a contract terminable at-will, but state that such relationships are more
analogous to the tort of interference with business relations and treat them
accordingly.' The fact that the at-will status of an employee is not a bar to
an interference claim is significant. Under the traditional formulation of the
employment at-will doctrine, an employee may be discharged for a good
41.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 766 cmt. g (1977).

42. Id. § 766B cmt. c.
43. Agugliaro v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 802 F. Supp. 956, 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying New
York law); Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, 565 A.2d 285, 290 (D.C. 1989); Hall v. Integon Life Ins. Co.,
454 So. 2d 1338, 1344 (Ala. 1984); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1041
(Ariz. 1985); Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 250 S.E.2d 442, 444 (Ga. 1978); Chapman v. Crown Glass Corp.,
557 N.E.2d 256, 265 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990); Bochnowski v. Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 571
N.E.2d 282, 284-85 (Ind. 1988); Toney v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 849, 852-53
(Iowa 1990); Prysak v. R.L. Polk Co., 483 N.W.2d 629, 635 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Nordling v.
Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 505 (Minn. 1991); Levens v. Campbell, 733 So. 2d
753, 760 (Miss. 1998); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Huff v.
Swartz, 606 N.W.2d 461, 467 (Neb. 2000); Privette v. Univ. of N.C., 385 S.E.2d 185, 190 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1989); Hennum v. City of Medina, 402 N.W.2d 327, 338-39 (N.D. 1987); Lewis v. Or.
Beauty Supply Co., 733 P.2d 430, 433 (Or. 1987); Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. Standard PumpAldrich Div., 422 A.2d 611, 618 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Todd v. S. C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co., 321 S.E.2d 602, 607 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Forrester v. Stockstill, 869 S.W.2d 328, 331
(Tenn. 1994); Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1989); Trepanier v.
Getting Organized, Inc., 583 A.2d 583, 589 (Vt. 1990); Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr.,
506 S.E.2d 578, 591 n.20 (W. Va. 1998); Harman v. La Crosse Tribune, 344 N.W.2d 536, 540
(Wis. Ct. App. 1984); but see Weld v. Southeastern Cos., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1322 n.8 (M.D.
Fla. 1998) (stating that an at-will employment relationship does not amount to an advantageous
business relationship that can be protected from interference).
44. Infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Toney v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 849, 853-54 (Iowa 1990).
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reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all. 46 Hence, the at-will doctrine itself
is often a quite significant hurdle to overcome for a discharged plaintiff. In
order to avoid the limitations of the rule, a discharged employee must
somehow prove that the discharge was not merely for a bad reason in the
sense that it was unwise, unfair, or founded on personal dislike, but that it
offended public policy in some fashion. 47 A firing in contravention of an
Other
anti-discrimination statute provides the most obvious example.
possible examples (depending upon the jurisdiction in question) include
situations where an employer fires an employee for engaging in jury
service,' for refusing to commit perjury,' or for reporting illegal behavior
on the part of the employer.s" Even here, however, plaintiffs can potentially
face significant obstacles. For one, some jurisdictions still cling tenaciously
to the employment at-will rule and are reluctant to create these types of
public policy exceptions to the rule.5 For another, even with the statutorilybased discrimination statutes, plaintiffs must prove a highly specific form of
motivation on the part of the employer. For example, federal courts are
sometimes willing to rule as a matter of law that a plaintiff lacks sufficient
evidence of discriminatory intent in order to prevail on her discrimination
claim, despite the existence of evidence which, at first glance, would seem to
raise a jury question."2 As Ann McGinley has characterized the situation,
judges often rely on the employment at-will doctrine to conclude that an
employer has a "license to be mean," as long as there is no evidence that the

46. See, e.g., Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708, 709 (Ala. 1978).
47.
Estlund, supra note 1, at 1662. Cynthia L. Estlund effectively summarizes the modern
formulation of the employment at-will rule when she states that "employers are free to fire
employees for good reason or no reason, but not for the many bad reasons that are condemned by
law." Id.
48. See, e.g., Pearson v. Hope Lumber & Supply Co., 820 P.2d 443 (Okla. 1991).
49.
See, e.g., Ressler v. Humane Soc. of Grand Forks, 480 N.W.2d 429 (N.D. 1992).
50.
See generally Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Green, 855 S.W.2d 136, 140 (Tex. App.
1993).
51.
See, e.g., Dray v. New Mkt. Poultry Products, Inc., 518 S.E.2d 312, 313 (Va. 1999)
(refusing to recognize a whistle blower exception to the employment at-will rule).
52.
See, e.g., Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1247, 1252-53 (lth Cir. 1999)
(upholding judgment as a matter of law in favor of employer in a sexual harassment case where the
supervisor was accused of constantly following the plaintiff, making sniffing noises while staring at
her crotch, and bumping hips with her in the hallway, because such conduct was not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to form the basis of a Title VII claim); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990
F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding on summary judgment in favor of employer that no
actionable harassment occurred where plaintiff's supervisor asked plaintiff out on dates, called her a
"dumb blond," placed his hand on her shoulder several times, placed "I love you" signs in her
work area, and attempted to kiss her on one or more occasions).
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meanness was motivated by discriminatory animus." Thus, plaintiffs often
carry a difficult burden of proof in traditional wrongful discharge cases.m'
As such, on their face, at-will employment relationships have limited
legal value. If they are viewed as contracts, then they are contracts with
rather weak contours. Such relationships may be terminated by either party,
literally, upon a whim. However, interference theory gives greater form and
Under interference theory, at-will
substance to such relationships.
relationships take on greater value. Although the parties to the relationship
themselves are still free to sever the relationship for whatever reason they
may choose without fear of incurring liability, outsiders do not enjoy such
freedom. Suddenly, what was once a mere desire for continued employment
on the part of an employee now takes on property-like dimensions, "good
against the world."' 5
III. THE PRACTICAL REALITIES OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIMS IN
THE WORKPLACE

Most of the case law surrounding interference claims in the employment
context involve one of two situations: (1) claims by an employee against a
supervisor or officer for causing the termination of an employment
relationship between the employee and the corporate employer, or (2) claims
by an employee against a former employer for interfering with a new or
prospective employment relationship. Despite the seemingly natural fit
between interference claims and traditional employment law paradigms, the
fit has not been altogether seamless. Although courts have experienced less
difficulty in cases involving a former employer's attempts to interfere with
an employee's new employment relationship, these types of cases have not
been free of controversy. The greater confusion, however, has come in the
former category of cases involving interference by an officer or supervisor
which leads to the discharge of an employee. Before getting to the root of
the problem, this section looks at some of the tangential problems that often
arise when employees bring interference claims in the employment setting.

53. Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Enployment At Will: Toward a Coherent
National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1459-60 (1993).
54. Id.; Estlund, supra note 1,at 1670.
55. Dan Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REV. 335,
351 (1980). Of course, this phenomenon is not specific to interference claims alone. Antidiscrimination laws have the same effect.
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A. Types of Claims

1. Employee vs. Former Supervisor or Officer
Perhaps the most frequently asserted interference claim in the workplace
is that of an employee against an officer or supervisor of the corporate
employer for interfering with the relationship between the employee and the
corporation. Typically, the officer or supervisor, allegedly motivated by
discriminatory animus, 56 malice," or self-interest,"' induces or causes the
employee's termination. The situations involved in this type of claim tend to
run the gamut. In some cases, the officer or supervisor has the actual
authority to hire and fire and acts upon that authority. 9 In other cases, the
officer or supervisor merely recommends adverse action 6 or passes his
evaluation of the employee's work on to higher ups within the company6'
who do the actual firing.
2. Employee vs. Former Employer
The other common situation in which an employment-related interference
claim can arise is where a former employer takes action which somehow
affects an employee's new or prospective employment relationship. This
situation often involves the case of a former employer passing along
information to a current or prospective employer which ends up influencing
the current or prospective employer to no longer deal with the employee.
Thus, an interference with prospective contractual relations claim may arise
where a former employer responds to a request for a reference concerning a
former employee.'
Sometimes the alleged interference occurs where the

56. See, e.g., Nelson v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 949 F. Supp. 254, 260-61 (D. Del. 1996).
57. See, e.g., Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, 565 A.2d 285, 290-91 (D.C. 1989).
58. See, e.g., Hunter v. Bd. of Trs. of Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 481 N.W.2d 510, 518 (Iowa
1992).
59. See, e.g., Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir. 1996).
60. See, e.g., Sorrells, 565 A.2d at 290.
61. See, e.g., Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 278-79 (Wyo. 1985).
62. Delloma v. Consolidation Coal Co., 996 F.2d 168, 170-71 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying
Illinois law); Watkins v. General Refractories Co., 805 F. Supp 911, 917-18 (D. Utah 1992)
(applying Utah law); Brown v. Chem Haulers, Inc., 402 So. 2d 887, 888 (Ala. 1981); Sigal Constr.
Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204, 1205-06 (D.C. 1991); Nowik v. Mazda Motors of America
(East), Inc., 523 So. 2d 769, 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Turner v. Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d
1106, 1115-17 (Kan. 1986); Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg'l Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297, 305, 315 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Eib v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 633 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
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former employer volunteers, without awaiting a request,

potentially

employee.63

damaging information about a former
These types of scenarios represent the classic interference case. Here, the
former employer is truly an outside third party, separate from the

relationship between the employee and the current or prospective employer.
In contrast, claims against supervisors or officers for interfering in an
employment relationship with a current employer represent more complicated
and subtle forms of interference which bring with them various difficulties.
B. Some Initial Problems with Judicial Treatment of Interference Claims in
the Employment Setting
Perhaps the greatest utility of interference claims in the employment
context is that they provide another possible avenue of recovery where

recovery against the employer would be foreclosed. In some instances, the
limitations of the employment at-will rule and statutory anti-discrimination
laws may prevent an employee from recovering against her employer.
However, an interference theory can potentially still be used to obtain
recovery from the employer's agent who may actually have been responsible
for the employee's dismissal.

In order for an interference claim to exist, there must be three parties
involved: the two parties to the relationship and the interfering party." In
the case of an employee suing a former employer for interfering with a
current or prospective employment relationship, the requirement that three

parties exist is easily satisfied. If the source of the interference stems from
Geyer v. Steinbronn, 506 A.2d 901, 904 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); DiBiasio v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg.
Co., 525 A.2d 489, 490 (R.I. 1987).
63. Saliba v. Exxon Corp., 865 F. Supp. 306, 308-09 (W.D. Va. 1994) (involving situation
where former employer contacted attorney's new employer and informed it of former employer's
displeasure with attorney's alleged violation of confidentiality agreement); Bon Temps Agency, Ltd.
v. Greenfield, 584 N.Y.S.2d 824, 826 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (involving agency's sending of letter
by counsel to party with which employee was allegedly about to enter into contract, advising of
employee's acknowledgment of agency's trade secrets, and warning it against improper use of such
secrets); Collincini v. Honeywell, Inc., 601 A.2d 292, 293-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (affirming jury
verdict on interference claim where defendant-employer notified plaintiff's new employer that
plaintiff was interfering with defendant's existing contracts); Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786,
787 (Utah 1994) (affirming jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on interference claim where former
employer contacted plaintiff's new employer and informed new employer that employee had
previously signed a noncompete covenant); Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d
578, 581-82 (W. Va. 1998) (involving situation where former employer, without awaiting request,
informed new employer that employee had been employed as a union organizer).
64. See, e.g., Postell-Russell v. Inmont Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
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negative information passed on to the current or prospective employer, then
an interference claim may prove to be an effective alternative to a defamation
claim. For a defamation claim to succeed, there must exist a false and
defamatory statement of fact.0 Thus, for example, a former employer who
truthfully reports that an employee was absent from work on twenty
occasions during a one-year period should not be held liable under a
defamation theory. In contrast, truth is not necessarily a defense to an
interference claim in all jurisdictions.

Although the Second Restatement

provides that truth is a defense to an interference claim," several courts have
ruled that a truthful statement may, nonetheless, be actionable.67 The
majority of courts to consider the question, however, have agreed with the
Second Restatement's position and concluded that the providing of truthful
information is not actionable."
In claims brought against supervisors or officers for interfering with an
existing employment relationship, interference claims may provide an
alternative to the traditional statutory or common law wrongful discharge

claims. In numerous cases, employees have been able to proceed to trial and
sometimes succeed in suits against supervisors, managers, officers, and
directors of corporations for their interference with the employment
relationship between a corporate employer and an employee." As such, the
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 558, 581A (1977).
66. Id. § 772(a).
67. Carman v. Entner, No. 13978, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 387, at *23 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb.
2, 1994); Collincini v. Honeywell, Inc., 601 A.2d 292, 295 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Pratt v.
Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 790 (Utah 1994); see also Stonestreet Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Chicago
Custom Engraving, Inc., No. 93-C1785, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5548, at *16 n.2 (N.D. Iii. Apr.
26, 1994) (stating that the providing of truthful information only entitles a defendant to a qualified
privilege which may be defeated ); C.N.C. Chemical Corp. v. Pennwalt Corp., 690 F. Supp. 139,
143 (D.R.I. 1988) (noting "the general rule that communicating truthful information does not
constitute 'improper' interference," but stating that the rule is not absolute and depends upon the
circumstances); Puente v. Dillard's Dep't Stores, No. 07-98-0013-CV, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS
7627, at *17 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1998) (noting that truth may be a defense to a tortious
interference claim, but stating that "[elven assuming that Kayser called Bartley and gave entirely
truthful statements to him, her act might still constitute tortious interference.").
68. Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 506 S.E.2d 578, 592 (W. Va. 1998).
69. Soltani v. Smith, 812 F. Supp. 1280, 1297 (D.N.H. 1993) (denying summary judgment
to individual superiors on plaintiff's interference claim); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp.,
710 P.2d 1025, 1043-44 (Ariz. 1985) (reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of
supervisor); Trimble v. City and County of Denver, 697 P.2d 716, 726-27 (Colo. 1985) (affirming
judgment against director of hospital); Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, 565 A.2d 285, 286 (D.C. 1989)
(upholding jury verdict against supervisor); Girsberger v. Kresz, 633 N.E.2d 781, 791-92 (Ill.
App.
Ct. 1993) (upholding $784,000 jury verdict against officer of corporation for his interference with
plaintiff's employment contract); Hunter v. Bd. of Trs. of Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 481 N.W.2d
510, 511 (Iowa 1992) (upholding $173,821 jury verdict against executive director of medical center
for his interference with plaintiff's employment contract); Mailhiot v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co.,
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logical conclusion, whether stated explicitly or implied by the court, is that
these individuals may be third parties to the relationship. In many instances,

the actions which give rise to such an interference claim would not be
actionable under a wrongful discharge theory." Thus, there may be cases in

which an employee cannot proceed against the employer due to the
limitations of the at-will rule, but may be able to proceed against the

employer's agent under an interference theory.

Admittedly, an employee

still may not sue her employer for a discharge motivated by an improper, but

non-discriminatory purpose; however, the employee may, in some instances,
potentially hold liable the individual who actually did the firing or who
recommended the firing. Although that person's pockets may not be as deep
as the corporate employer's and attorney fees might not be available as they
would under a statutory discrimination claim, interference claims create
another avenue of recovery where recovery would be foreclosed under the
employment at-will rule.
1. Third-Party Status vs. Privilege
One area in which courts have demonstrated a frustrating lack of
consistency is in the assessment of one of the most basic requirements of an

510 N.E.2d 773, 776 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (upholding $95,000 jury verdict against president of
bank for interference with plaintiff's employment relationship with bank); Stack v. Marcum, 382
N.W.2d 743, 743-44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of
supervisor); Eib v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 633 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing grant
of summary judgment in favor of officers); Barker v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 524 S.E.2d 821, 828
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of manager); Renner v.
Wurdeman, 434 N.W.2d 536, 541-42 (Neb. 1989) (reversing summary judgment against employee
where employee alleged that president acted in his individual capacity in interfering with
employment relationship); Giordano v. Aerolift, Inc., 818 P.2d 950, 951 (Or. App. Ct. 1991)
(affirming $25,000 jury verdict against chief operating officer); Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.
Standard Pump-Aldrich Div., 422 A.2d 611, 621-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (reversing grant of
summary judgment in favor of manager); see also Creel v. Davis, 544 So. 2d 145, 146, 148 (Ala.
1989) (affirming $75,000 jury verdict against physician who recommended to plaintiff's immediate
supervisor that plaintiff be fired).
70. Many of the cases cited in note 69 involve this situation. For a clear example, see
Sorrells, 565 A.2d 285. In Sorrells, the plaintiff's supervisor allegedly acted with malice in
bringing about the employee's termination. Id. at 286. However, the supervisor's behavior was
not discriminatory, nor did it offend public policy in such a way as to form the basis of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy claim. Id. at 289. Thus, the employee could not proceed
against her employer for wrongful discharge. Id. She could and did, however, successfully sue her
supervisor under an interference theory for her supervisor's improper interference with the
employee's relation with her employer. Id. at 290-92.
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interference claim-whether there are actually three parties involved. 7' As
mentioned, in order for a plaintiff to proceed with an interference claim, the
interference must have come from an outside party, i.e., someone not a party
to the relationship.7
Thus, by definition, a party to a business relation
cannot be charged with interfering with his own relation.' In the case of a
former employer interfering with the existing or prospective employment
relationship of a former employee, the requirement that three parties exist is
obviously satisfied and poses no real problems.
The tendency of many courts, however, is to ignore or, at the least, gloss
over this essential requirement when an officer or supervisor ostensibly
acting on behalf of a corporate employer causes an employee to be
discharged. Some courts skip past the requirement that a third party exist
and proceed directly to the issue of whether the interference was privileged,
justified, or improper. 74 This approach overlooks a key premise of both tort
and corporate law; namely, that a corporation may only act through its
agents. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, where an agent acts
within the scope of employment, the agent's acts are attributable to the
corporation and become those of the corporation.' Thus, under traditional
principles, an agent who acts within the scope of employment and on behalf
of the corporation's interest is a party to the relationship. Therefore, an
agent who acts within the scope of his employment cannot be held liable for
interfering with a contract between his principal and a third party because, in
the words of one court, to do so "would be, 7in
effect, to hold the corporation
6
liable in tort for breaching its own contract."
However, the approach of many courts is to gloss over the requirement
that a third party exist and instead first focus on whether the actions of the
officer or supervisor were privileged or improper. Thus, some courts hold
that an officer or supervisor who brings about the plaintiff's discharge acted

71.
See generally Frank B. Harty & Thomas W. Foley, Employment Torts: Emerging Areas
of Employer Liability, 39 DRAKE L. REv. 3, 32-33 (1989-90) (noting that courts have struggled
with cases in which employees allege that supervisors or managers were third parties who could

interfere with the employment relationship).
72. Supra note 64 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Levens v. Campbell, 733 So. 2d 753, 757 (Miss. 1999).
74.

See Girsberger v. Kresz, 633 N.E.2d 781, 791 (II. App. Ct. 1993); Hunter, 481 N.W.2d

at 517-18; Draghetti v. Chmielewski, 626 N.E.2d 862, 868-69 (Mass. 1994); Welch v. Bancorp
Mgmt. Advisors, Inc., 675 P.2d 172, 178 (Or. 1983). But see McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d

841, 847 (Or. 1995) (recognizing the court's previous lack of clarity on the distinction between the
third-party element of an interference claim and the improper means/improper purpose element of
the tort).
75. See, e.g., A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 579 A.2d 69, 73 (Conn. 1990).
76. Bowman v. Grolsche Bierbrouwerij B.V., 474 F. Supp. 725, 733 (D.Conn. 1979).
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improperly or in an unprivileged fashion without first reaching the question
of whether the individual is a third party to the employment relationship.'
Under the Second Restatement, the two issues appear to be one and the

same. 8 Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, an employee who is
motivated solely by a desire to injure another employee or to advance his
own interests does not act within the scope of employment.79 Likewise, that
same employee has probably acted improperly under the balancing-of-factors
approach laid out by the Second Restatement.' Indeed, courts sometimes
refer to the third-party requirement of interference claims and the "privilege
to interfere" interchangeably, even within the same opinion.8"
Despite their similarity, however, the two concepts are distinct. For one,
under the balancing-of-factors approach toward assessing whether a
defendant's actions were improper, the motivation of the defendant and the
interests sought to be advanced by the defendant are but two factors to

consider. Regrettably, the tendency of many courts in these types of cases
has been to focus almost exclusively on the defendant's motivation.
77. See Hunter, 481 N.W.2d at 517-18; Eib v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 633 S.W.2d 432, 436
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Barker v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 524 S.E.2d 821, 826 (N.C. Ct. App.
2000); Gordon v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 489 A.2d 1364, 1370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
78. See generally Gergen, supra note 11, at 1197 n.116 (noting that the question of whether
an agent acted within his authority or against the interests of his principal is similar to the question
of whether the agent acted improperly).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 (1959). Accord Baumeister v. Plunkett, 673
So. 2d 994, 999 (La. 1996) (cited in William R. Corbett, Faragher, Ellerth, and the FederalLaw of
Vicanous LiabilityFor Sexual Harassment by Supervisors: Something Lost, Something Gained, And
Something to Guard Against, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 801, 807 (1999)).

In his thoughtful

article on the relation between the concept of vicarious liability in federal discrimination law and
state tort law, Professor Corbett notes a disconcerting, but quite accurate, reality: there are two
distinct conceptions of vicarious liability. Corbett, supra, at 807. As Corbett suggests, employee
conduct of a sexual nature which might not be considered within the scope of employment under
state tort law could very easily subject an employer to liability under federal discrimination law.
Id. Corbett suggests that the recent Supreme Court pronouncements on the subject of employers'
vicarious liability for sexual harassment committed by their employees is an explicit rejection of
state law respondeat superior theory. Id. at 810-11 (discussing Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)). This Article uses the
term "scope of employment" in the traditional state tort law sense.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. d (1977) (stating that if the actor's sole
motivation was to interfere with the other's contractual relations, "the interference is almost certain
to be held improper.").
81. DuSesoi v. United Ref. Co., 540 F. Supp. 1260, 1275 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (recognizing that
a party cannot interfere with a contract to which it is a party and that corporations may only act
through their agents, but considering the issue of whether the individual's interference was
actionable as one of privilege); Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742
So. 2d 381, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (addressing law firm's argument that it was not a third
party to the contractual relationship, but deciding the interference question on the grounds of
privilege).
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Although courts sometimes will declare an interference to be improper where
the defendant employs wrongful means to accomplish the interference,' the
typical approach focuses on motivation to the exclusion of the other factors
listed in section 767.8' As a result, a court that considers only the
defendant's motivation in assessing whether an interference is improper is, in
actuality, doing little more than asking whether the officer or supervisor was
acting within the scope of employment.
The correct approach is quite simple, both in theory and in practice. Any
analysis of an interference claim must, by definition, begin with the question
of whether the officer or supervisor was a third party to the relationship.
For example, in McGanty v. Staudenraus, 4 the Supreme Court of Oregon
was confronted with a complaint that alleged on its face that the president of
the company had interfered with the relationship between the employee and
the company by sexually harassing the employee while acting within the
scope of his employment. The individual defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that, as he was alleged to have acted within the
scope of his employment, he could not be a third party to the relationship.'
The employee argued that the fact that she claimed in her complaint that the
president had acted within the scope of his employment was not dispositive;
instead, she argued that the president had acted improperly and with mixed
motives, thereby creating a jury question.'
The court, quite correctly,
recognized that the employee's argument placed the cart before the horse:
"Whether a party has acted by either an improper means or with an improper
purpose is relevant.. . only if that party first meets the threshold test of
being a third party to the contractual relationship with which the interference
allegedly has occurred."" Where, as in McGanty, the plaintiff alleges in her
complaint that the defendant has acted within the scope of his employment,
this allegation constitutes an admission which should prevent the plaintiff
from proceeding under an interference theory.'
82. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 308-09 (Utah 1982).
83. See, e.g., Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, 565 A.2d 285, 290-92 (D.C. 1989) (listing the factors
contained in section 767, but analyzing the case in terms of whether the interference was justified
and considering only the defendant's motive in reaching its determination).
84. 901 P.2d 841 (Or. 1995).
85. Id. at 845-46.
86. Id. at 847.
87. Id.
88. Interestingly, the court took time to help clarify its prior holdings which had created
ambiguity in this regard, not unlike that discussed in notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
Previously, the court had analyzed several interference claims without reference to whether the
individual defendant was, in fact, a third person to the relationship. Instead, the court assessed
whether the individual defendants had acted improperly in interfering with the employment
relationships in question.
Id. at 847-49. Thus, the court recognized that its prior decisions had
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The McGanly opinion is sound in both law and policy. The plaintiff's
complaint also contained an allegation that the president's harassment had
forced her to resign, thus forming the basis of a wrongful discharge claim."
The court held that, as the facts were alleged, knowledge of the president's
acts of harassment could be imputed to the employer. As such, the plaintiff
was free to proceed under a constructive discharge theory." The court's
decision has the benefit of preserving a plaintiff's ability to seek recovery for
actions that fall outside the protection of the at-will rule while preventing a
plaintiff from pleading inconsistently and around the at-will rule.
In
rejecting the plaintiff's interference claim, the court noted that the premise of
the doctrine of respondeat superior is that when an employee is acting in the
scope of the employee's employment, the employee is acting as the
employer, and not as an independent entity.9
Therefore, it would be
incongruous to permit a plaintiff to claim in one instance that the individual
defendant was acting within the scope of employment for purposes of
advancing a wrongful discharge claim, but ignoring the effects of such an
allegation for purposes of an interference claim.
2. Going Beyond Third Party Status: Privilege vs. Impropriety
Once it has been established that the intentional interference was
committed by a third party, the next step under the Second Restatement is to
determine whether the interference was improper. As mentioned, the
authors chose to frame the question of tortious interference as one of
impropriety rather than privilege.'
Despite this fact, for some courts, the
question is not whether the interference was "improper," but rather whether
it was privileged or justified." Although the authors chose to frame the issue
in terms of improper behavior, they did recognize that the traditional concept
of privilege or justification could still play a role in interference analysis.
The establishment of a privilege involves a weighing of competing factors in
order to arrive at a socially desirable result." Thus, regardless of whether a
court employs the traditional concepts of privilege or justification or the

"not been entirely clear respecting the distinction between the third-party element of the tort and the
improper means/improper purpose element of the tort." Id. at 847.
89. Id. at 853.
90. Id. at 857.
91. Id. at846.
92. Supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
93. Supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
94. KEETON, supra note 25, § 16, at 109.
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balancing-of-factors approach of section 767, it should, in theory, be
considering roughly the same factors."
Instead, most courts tend to focus on the motives of the defendant or the
interests sought to be advanced by the defendant to the exclusion of other
factors.'
For example, the "privilege to interfere" referred to by some
courts may be lost where the officer or supervisor who induced or caused the
termination of the relationship acted out of a desire to injure the plaintiff, for
pecuniary benefit, or for reasons apart from advancing the corporations's
interests.' This consideration parallels the Second Restatement's advice that
the defendant's motive and the interests sought to be advanced by the
defendant should be considered in assessing whether the interference was
improper.98 However, it largely omits consideration of the other factors
listed in section 767.
As the figure below illustrates, courts tend to follow one of four basic
approaches in addressing the actions of an officer or supervisor:

Mixed motive

Predominant motive

Nature of Protection
Supervisor's or officer's interference is
privileged (or not
improper) where
supervisor or officer is motivated in part to
benefit the employer; privilege is lost if
supervisor's or officer's actions are totally
unrelated to benefitting the employer.
Supervisor's or officer's motive to benefit
the employer must predominate over other,
self-interested motives in order for the
interference to be privileged (or not
improper).

95. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. j (1977) ("In some
situations the process of weighing the conflicting factors set forth in this Section has already been
performed by the courts, and incipient privileges and rules defining conduct as not improper are
developing.").
96. Supra note 83 and accompanying text. See generally Huff v. Swartz, 606 N.W.2d 461,
468 (Neb. 2000) (criticizing a prior opinion by the Nebraska Court of Appeals and noting that the
fact that a co-employee acts in furtherance of interests other than that of the employer does not
necessarily establish unjustified interference).
97. See, e.g., Nickens v. Labor Agency, 600 A.2d 813, 820 (D.C. 1991).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767(a), (b), (d) (1977).
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Absolute privilege

Supervisor or officer has an absolute
privilege to interfere with an at-will
employee's relationship with his or her
employer.

Catch-all

Supervisor's or officer's interference is
improper or unprivileged where supervisor
or officer exceeds the scope of employment,
acts with malice, acts in bad faith, and/or
uses improper means to accomplish the
interference.

Perhaps most common is the first approach, in which a supervisor or
officer retains a privilege to interfere unless the supervisor or officer is
motivated solely out of personal interests, unrelated to the employer's
interests. Where the supervisor or officer is motivated at least in part to
benefit the employer, the privilege remains intact, despite the fact that the
supervisor or officer may also have acted out of self-interest." This standard
typically applies whether the employment relationship is at-will or
contractual. 1w
This mixed-motive standard is actually almost identical to the traditional
test for determining whether an employee acts within the scope of
employment. Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 236, "the fact
that the predominant motive of the [agent] is to benefit himself.. . does not
prevent the act from being within the scope of employment."'
The act of
the agent is outside the scope of employment only "if it is done with no

99. Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Davis, 687 F.2d 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[Wjhere, as
here, an advisor is motivated in part by a desire to benefit his principal, his conduct in inducing a
breach of contract should be privileged."); Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell,
P.A., 742 So. 2d 381, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) ("The privilege [of an officer or employee of
a contracting party] is destroyed where [the officer or] an employee acts solely with ulterior
purposes, without an honest belief that his actions would benefit the employer, and the [officer or]
employee's conduct concerning the contract or business relationship is not in the employer's best
interest."); HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 545 N.E.2d 672, 678 (I1.
1989) ("A defendant who is protected by a privilege, however, is not justified in engaging in
conduct which is totally unrelated or even antagonistic to the interest which gave rise to defendant's
privilege."); Welch v. Bancorp Mgmt. Advisors, Inc., 675 P.2d 172, 178-79 (Or. 1983) (adopting
a mixed-motives test whereby corporate officers or employees are privileged to interfere unless they
act against the employer's best interests or solely for their own benefit).
100. See, e.g., Salit, 742 So.2d at 386 (referring to the privilege to interfere in the context of
both contractual and business relationships).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 236 cnt. b (1959).
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Thus, the

mixed-motive approach to privilege, if considered in isolation, is merely
another way of asking if the agent was a third party to the relationship.
Another, lesser-used approach extends a privilege to officers or
supervisors where the motive to benefit the employer predominates over
other, self-interested motives.1°3 In Geolar, Inc. v. Gilbert/Commonwealth,
Inc., " the Supreme Court of Alaska laid out the commonly-accepted notion
that an agent is privileged to interfere with his principal's relationship with
another if the agent is acting to further the principal's best interest.' °5
However, the court added the stipulation that the essential question was
whether the agent's "actions were predominately motivated by a desire to
protect [the principal's] interests or by spite, malice, or some other improper
objective.' 06
Perhaps least common is the absolute privilege afforded to a manager to
induce an employee's termination by a California appellate court. In
Halvorsen v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc.,'07 a manager allegedly induced
the plaintiffs employer to discharge the plaintiff because the plaintiff had
embarrassed the manager during a supervisory meeting. Relying upon the
policy of promoting and protecting an employer's control over his business,
as well as protecting confidential communications between agents and
principals, the court held that a manager's state of mind was irrelevant in
assessing an interference premised upon termination of an at-will
employee.'0° The court reasoned that a corporation may only act through its
agents. Therefore, by extending an absolute privilege to managers in such
cases, the court believed it was acting to prevent employees from pleading

102. Id. § 235.
103. King v. Sioux City Radiological Group, P.C., 985 F. Supp. 869, 882-84 (N.D. Iowa
1997) (discussing interference in terms of improper behavior, rather than privilege, but holding that
agent's interference with business relationship between employer and another employee is not
improper unless there is "substantial evidence of a predominant motive by the defendant to
terminate the contractfor improper reasons."); Geolar, Inc. v. Gilbert/Commonwealth, Inc., 874
P.2d 937, 940-41 (Alaska 1994); Forrester v. Stockstill, 869 S.W.2d 328, 334-35 (Tenn. 1994)
('[When an officer, director, or employee of a corporation acts within the general range of his
authority, and his actions are substantially motivated by an intent to further the interest of the
corporation" the officer, director, or employee is immune from liability.) (emphasis added); Pratt
v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah 1994) (holding that an improper purpose exists where the
defendant's ill will predominates over legitimate considerations).
104. 874 P.2d 937 (Alaska 1994).
105. Id. at 941.
106. Id.
107. 65 Cal. App. 4th 1383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
108. Id. at 1394-96.
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around the employment at-will rule.' 9 "[C]hailenging the motives of
management... in effect, would require management, that is, the employer,
to have good cause to terminate."" 0 Thus, in the court's view, extending an
absolute privilege was the best method of preventing discharged plaintiffs
from circumventing the at-will rule.
The final approach is, in reality, a catch-all category. Many states are

less than clear as to when the interference of officers and supervisors is
unprivileged or improper. The comments to the Second Restatement provide
that, although the term "malice" is frequently used in interference cases, it
should not be understood to mean in the sense of spite or ill will."' Instead,
malice, for purposes of an interference claim, simply means "'intentional
interference without justification. '""2 As such, ill will is not an essential
condition of liability for courts following the Second Restatement
approach." 3 Some courts, however, specifically require a showing of actual4
malice in the sense of spite, ill will, or a desire to harm the plaintiff."
Other courts require that the officer or supervisor must have acted in bad
faith (possibly meaning "maliciously" or contrary to the interests of the
employer) in order for the privilege to be lost."'
Again, it is not always
clear whether this interest must simply exist, whether it must predominate or
whether it must be the sole interest." 6 Still other cases note that an
interference may be improper as a result of either an improper motive or
improper means, such as misrepresentation of facts, threats of violence, or

109. Id. at 1396.
110. Id.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. s (1977) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. k).

112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Barlow v. Int'l Harvester Co., 522 P.2d 1102, 1114 (Idaho 1974).
114. Nickens v. Labor Agency, 600 A.2d 813, 820 (D.C. 1991) (holding that privilege may
be lost, inter alia, where defendant acts to harm the plaintiff); Nordling v. Northern States Power
Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. 1991) (using the terms "improper" and "justified" almost
interchangeably, and holding that while motive and malice are but one factor to be considered in
assessing whether an interference is improper, "when motive or malice becomes relevant on the
issue of improper interference, that this malice be actual malice"); Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
429 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Mass. 1981) (holding that supervisor cannot be liable "unless he acted out of
malevolence, that is, with 'actual' malice").
115. Martin v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 889, 896 (Okla. 1998) (holding that privilege to interfere
may be lost where agent or employee acts in bad faith); Stanfield v. National Elec. Contractors
Ass'n, Inc., 588 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) ("A corporate officer is privileged to
induce a corporation to breach a contract so long as he acts in good faith to protect the corporation
and does not act for his own personal benefit.").
116. See, e.g., Nickens, 600 A.2d at 820 (holding that a corporate officer may lose the
privilege to interfere if he acts maliciously or for his own benefit, but failing to identify whether
these must be the sole motives or whether they must predominate over legitimate motives).
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defamation; however, there are comparatively few cases in which such
means have 1 been used by a court to justify a finding of improper
interference. 7
"Although the mixed-motives approach appears to be the most common
approach, it is by no means universally accepted. As mentioned, part of the
reason why the authors of the Second Restatement chose to define the tort in
terms of whether behavior was improper, rather than unprivileged, was
because they believed courts had not fully developed a crystallized set of
rules concerning the applicability of the privilege." 8 However, the authors
did not necessarily believe that the concepts of privilege and justification
were obsolete. Instead, the comments state that where a privilege to
interfere has developed to the point of crystallization of that privilege,
assessment of the factors listed in section 767 is unnecessary." 9 The various
formulations of the privilege concept, although often similar, tend to vary
from state to state. Thus, although the privilege to interfere may have
crystallized to a certain extent, there are still enough differing formulations
as to what types of behavior are actionable to create considerable
uncertainty.
3. The Privilege to Provide a Negative Reference
In the case of interference via negative information supplied to a
prospective employer, courts often borrow from defamation law in assessing
whether the interference was improper or unprivileged. As a result of this
reliance on a well-established body of law, less confusion has arisen in
interference cases in this type of case.
Perhaps the most commonly asserted claim in the case of a negative
reference is defamation.'"
Numerous courts have noted the analytical
similarity between interference and defamation claims.'' As a result, some
117. See generally Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 789 n.3 (Utah 1994) (noting that
under Utah law an interference may be improper as a result of improper motives or the use of
improper means, but calling into question the future vitality of the improper purpose prong of the
interference tort).
118. Supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 767 cmt. j (1977).
120. See generally J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices,
65 U. CHI. L. REV.. 115 (1998) (discussing the unwillingness of employers to provide employment
references in the context of defamation law).
121. See, e.g., Delloma v. Consolidation Coal Co., 996 F.2d 168, 172 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting
that defamation and interference claims are "analytically intertwined."). See also KEETON, supra
note 25, § 129, at 989 (noting that occasions privileged under the law of defamation may also be
considered justified or privileged in cases involving interference with contractual relations).
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courts import from defamation law the conditional privilege often afforded to
employers who are responding to a reference request."z In such situations, a
responding employer retains a privilege to supply even negative information
about a former employee provided that the employer does not somehow
abuse the privilege, for example, by excessive publication" or through
malice. n4
The employment reference situation is a case in which relatively clear
privileges have crystallized. Given the relatively high number of cases
involving negative employment references and the relative similarities in the
fact patterns of such cases, courts have been able to state a fairly clear
formulation of the existing privilege, which takes into account the competing
policy interests of employers and employees. Although there is a general
consensus that employers are reluctant to supply employment references for
fear of exposing themselves to defamation claims,'" there has at least
developed a consistent framework for analyzing such claims. Admittedly,
there are still difficult questions to be resolved, most notably the question of
whether the providing of truthful information is actionable under an
interference theory, but well-established defamation law has provided a
model which courts have been able to transfer to the interference setting with
little difficulty.

IV. THE BIGGER PROBLEM WITH INTERFERENCE CLAIMS IN THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT

The failure of courts to develop a unified standard with respect to when
an officer or supervisor's interference is improper or unprivileged is
symptomatic of their greater failure to fully assess the underlying
justifications for the privilege in the at-will setting.
As previously
mentioned, most states recognize a cause of action for interference with an
at-will employment relationship."
However, courts have been less than
clear about which version of the interference torts should apply: interference
122. Delloma, 996 F.2d at 171-72 (applying Illinois law); Watkins v. Gen. Refractories Co.,
805 F. Supp. 911, 918 (D. Utah 1992) (applying Utah law); Tieman v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr.,
506 S.E.2d 578, 592-93 (W. Va. 1998); see also Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg'I Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d
297, 314 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) ("without right or justifiable cause") (quoting Alexander &
Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assoc., 650 A.2d 260 (Md. 1994)).
123. See, e.g., Delloma, 996 F.2d at 172.
124. 0. Lee Reed & Jan W. Henkel, Facilitatingthe Flow of Truthful PersonnelInformation:
Some Needed Change in the Standard Required to Overcome the Qualified Privilege to Defan, 26
AM. Bus. L. J. 305, 317 (1988).
125. Verkerke, supra note 120, at 115.
126. Supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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with contractual relations or interference with business relations, or
prospective contractual relations. Some courts explicitly lump interference
with at-will employment cases into the interference with business relations
pile.I17 Others analogize at-will employment relationships to contracts
terminable at-will, but treat such cases as an interference with business
relations because such contracts only give rise to a future expectancy in
employment, rather than a legal right to it.'2 Still others recognize the atwill nature of such relationships, but hold that they are contracts which
nonetheless may form the basis of an interference with contractual relations
claim.'" Finally, other courts pay little mind to such distinctions and appear
to use the torts interchangeably.'13
As one court has noted, the question as to the appropriate classification of
such claims involves more than mere semantics . 3' Despite the explicit
admonition contained in the Second Restatement that prospective contractual
relations and business relations are not deserving of the same level of
protection from interference as are fully formed contracts, 32 many courts fail
to draw any distinction between the two torts. As a result, some courts have
engaged upon a course of action which all but eliminates the employment atwill doctrine. The result is a serious disconnect between the modern version
of the employment at-will rule and tortious interference claims.
A. The Tension Between Employment At Will and Interference with Business
Relations
The employment at-will doctrine has been under attack for over thirty
years. Since Lawrence E. Blades' 1967 article criticizing the rule and
calling for its replacement with a just cause standard, 3 the rule has been the
subject of intense debate. Although much of the harshness that originally
characterized the rule has been tempered, employment at-will lives on.
Supporters of the modern at-will rule offer a host of justifications for its
continuation. Most supporters focus their arguments on economic grounds.
127. Torbett v. Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co., 314 S.E.2d 166, 173 (W. Va. 1983).

128. King v. Sioux City Radiological Group, 985 F. Supp. 869, 884 (N.D. Iowa 1997)
(applying Iowa law); Roy v. Woonsocket Inst. for Say., 525 A.2d 915, 918-19 & n. 4 (R.I. 1987).
129. Bochnowski v. Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 571 N.E.2d 282, 284-85 (Ind. 1991).
130. Torbett, 314 S.E.2d at 173.
131. King, 985 F. Supp. at 881.

132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. e (1977).
133. See generally Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967).
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Richard Epstein and Richard Posner, for example, argue that market forces
An employer who
limit the number of arbitrary and unjust discharges. '
acts arbitrarily will soon be viewed as untrustworthy both by current and
prospective employees, thus resulting in greater difficulty for the employerto
maintain its workforce under existing wages.' 35 In addition to these marketbased arguments, supporters raise other concerns associated with doing away
with the at-will rule, including increased record keeping costs; " timeconsuming and expensive litigation; 37 the risk of erroneous jury verdicts;' 3'
the decreased ability of employers to maintain discipline within the
workplace; 39 higher unemployment;" and the risk that the costs from these
problems will ultimately be passed on to employees and consumers as a
result. 4 '
For supporters of the employment at-will rule, the hallmark of the
doctrine is freedom. 42 In contrast to employment relationships governed by
formal contracts, employment at-will relationships provide both sides with
freedom of action. For Epstein, such freedom is essential because it "allows
both sides to take a wait-and-see attitude to their relationship so that new and
more accurate choices can be made on the strength of improved
information.""4 The benefits to employers of such relationships are obvious:
they are free to run their businesses in what they believe to be the most
efficient manner, unfettered by judicial second-guessing into the wisdom or
fairness of their decisions. However, supporters also note the freedom that
the at-will presumption affords to employees. Employees are likewise free to
walk away from the relationship at any time and for any reason. This
freedom benefits employees in that they are "not locked into an unfortunate

134. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947, 972-76
(1984); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 359 (5th ed. 1998).
135. Epstein, supra note 134, at 968; Posner, supra note 134, at 358.
136. Epstein, supra note 134, at 970.
137. Richard A. Posner, Hegel and Enployment At-Will: A Comment, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.

1625, 1633 (1989).
138. Epstein, supra note 134, at 970.
139. Posner, supra note 137, at 1633.
140. Id. at 1634.
141. Id.; Jeffrey L. Harrison, The 'New* Terminable At-Will Employment Contract: An
Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L. REv. 327, 331-45 (1984).
142. Epstein, supra note 134, at 953.
143. Epstein, supra note 134, at 969; Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and
Bad Policy: Thme to Fire Wrongful DischargeLaw, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901, 1923 (1996) (arguing
that the at-will rule allows "individuals freedom to find employment situations which more closely
approximate their [job security] preferences.").
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contract" and may move on if better opportunities present themselves or if

they "detecto some weakness in the internal structure of the firm."1"
Critics of the at-will doctrine challenge whether the attendant freedoms of
such relationships are equal in practice. These critics charge that, given
modern economic realities, the freedom of employees to pull up stakes and
end the relationship at anytime pales in comparison to employers' almost
unlimited freedom to end the relationship for a "good reason, bad reason, or
no reason at all."" ( Although different critics have proposed different
solutions to the perceived inequity,'" one of the more common refrains is
that at-will employees should be protected by something akin to the "just
cause" standard found in most collective bargaining agreements."
Underlying these types of arguments is the notion that collective
bargaining agreements are, in and of themselves, somehow "better" than
traditional at-will relationships. For one, they are more likely to provide a
greater measure of protection from arbitrary dismissals than do at-will
relationships.'" For another, collective bargaining agreements are the result
of a true meeting of minds between the parties. Contrary to the positions of
Epstein and others, some commentators argue that the at-will presumption is
neither the most efficient nor the most fair means of governing employment
relationships, because when employees bargain with their employers (if what

144. Epstein, supra note 134, at 969.
145. Ruth Gara Okediji, Status Rules: Doctrine as Discrimination in a Post-Hicks
Environment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 49, 57 (1998); see also Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of
Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: FairRepresentation and Employment At Will,
52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1082, 1106 (1984) ("Employees are inescapably vulnerable to economic
forces; their insecurity ought not be compounded by complete vulnerability to employer whimsy or
arbitrariness."); Blades, supra note 133, at 1411-12 (arguing that the superior bargaining power of
employers accounts for the prevalence of the at-will rule).
146. McGinley, supra note 53, at 1447 (calling for comprehensive federal legislation to
replace the at-will rule); See generally Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A
Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L. J.1 (1979) (calling for judicial reform of the at-will
rule).
147. Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV.
631, 672 (1988); William B. Gould IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in ContemporaryAmerica:
the Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 911 (1986); Peck,
supra note 146, at 4; Clyde W. Summers, Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Time for
a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 521-24 (1976).
148. Summers, supra note 145, at 483 (noting the greater security given to employees covered
by collective bargaining agreements than employees in the same firm not covered by such
agreements); see generally Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment Security: A Comparative
Institutional Debate, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1645, 1651 (1996) (citing the prevalence of just-cause
provisions in collective bargaining agreements and asking, "Ifworkers do not desire job security,
why do they negotiate for it collectively?").

520

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

they truly do can be called bargaining), they bargain with incomplete
information or from an unequal position. 49
To a certain extent, critics and supporters would agree that modem
employment law has lessened some of the unfairness of the pure notion-of
employment at will.'" The modern reformulation of the rule targets the most
Most supporters of the modem-day
egregiously offensive discharges."
version of employment at-will support the view expressed by various antidiscrimination laws that an employer should not have unfettered freedom to
discharge employees based upon the consideration of race, gender, age,
etc. ' Also, many supporters have no real problem with many of the public
policy exceptions to the at-will rule, such as permitting a cause of action
where an employee has been fired for refusing to commit perjury or in

retaliation for exercising a protected right.'

Thus, there is a general

consensus that employees have considerably greater protection than they did
in the first half of the twentieth century and that this change has been for the
better.
The dispute lies in those discharge situations that are less egregious than
mentioned. Many discharges which might be considered "wrongful" in the
abstract remain legal. Most employers face no liability for discharging
employees out of personal animosity (at least as long as the animosity is not
based on impermissible consideration of a protected trait). Also, most

employers face no liability for fabricating the reasons behind an employee's
discharge (at least as long as the employer does not publish the false

justification). Typically, only unionized employees covered under collective
bargaining agreements are protected from these types of actions. In short,
modern wrongful discharge law covers only the worst forms of employer
behavior and allows these other types of behaviors to go unpunished. For
supporters of the more modern version of the at-will rule, this is the most

practical and most efficient means of governing the employment relationship.
For opponents, these justifications are insufficient.
Regardless of the desirability of the modern at-will rule, there is an
argument that the current state of the rule is the result of decisions of courts
149. Blades, supra note 133, at 1411-12; Summers, supra note 145, at 1106-07; Gould, supra
note 147 at 892-94.
150. Estlund, supra note 1, at 1667 ("There is thus a fairly wide consensus among the leading
commentators on at-will employment that the law has legitimately and more or less adequately taken
care of the most egregious unjustified discharges. . .
151. Id. at 1661.
152. Id. at 1663-64 (characterizing the silence of supporters of the at-will rule as assent to this
exception to the at-will rule).
153. Id. (citing the positions of Judge Richard Posner and Professor Richard Epstein in favor
of allowing certain public policy exceptions to the at-will rule).
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and legislatures that this is the way the employment relationship should be
governed." s The utility of abolishing the at-will rule has been the subject of
a seemingly never-ending series of law review articles, legislative proposals,
and informal discussions. Some critics have challenged employment at-will
at the most basic starting point-that Horace Wood's assertion in 1877 that
American courts had by that time adopted an "inflexible" rule "that a general
or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at-will" and is terminable at the
will of either party 55 is simply wrong. "6
Since Blades' 1967 article, there has been a barrage of scholarly
commentary calling for courts and legislatures to see to the rule's demise.
Indeed, state legislatures have considered various pieces of legislation which
would have replaced the rule with a just cause standard. 5 7 Critics have
attacked the rule on economic, public policy, and emotional grounds.158
Courts and legislatures have considered these arguments, but instead of doing
away with the rule, their solution has been to carve out exceptions which
eliminate only the worst forms of wrongful discharges.' 59
Instead of abolishing the at-will rule, courts and legislatures have
attempted to draw a line. The line may be blurry at times, but it does
provide employers and employees with a rough sense of what types of
discharges are permissible. Modern wrongful discharge law targets only
employer behavior that affects both the employee and some interest of the
public at large. As Cynthia Estlund has stated, modem wrongful discharge
doctrines "protect not only the interests of employees but also the interests of
third parties or of the public - interests that would suffer if employers were
given the full power over their employees that the pure at-will regime would
afford. " 6 ° Thus, for example, the limitation on discharges in retaliation for
refusing to commit perjury protects not only the employee in question, but
154. For an exhaustive historical study into the adoption of the at-will rule, see Andrew P.
Moriss, Exploding Myths: An Empiricaland Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment AtWill, 59 Mo. L. REv. 679 (1994).
155. HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT, § 134, at 272
(1877).
156. Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118, 126 (1976).
157. Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward
Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 71 (1988) (noting, in 1988, the introduction of "just cause" bills
in several state legislatures).
158. Supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text; St. Antoine, supra note 157, at 67 (noting
the "piercing hurt to individuals" who are unjustly discharged in support of abolishment of the
rule).
159. To date, Montana remains the only state to have a just cause statute. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-901, -904 (1999).
160. Estlund, supra note 1, at 1664-65.
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important public interests. 6 ' Discharges which do not implicate such
interests remain legal. The line between lawful and unlawful discharges may
be vague in some instances, or, not yet drawn by some courts in others;
however, it is sufficiently clear to put employers on notice as to when they
may potentially face liability.
Congress has passed a series of anti-discrimination statutes. State
legislatures have considered, but rejected statutes that would require just
cause for discharge and instead passed legislation which, to varying degrees,
mirrors federal law and extends even greater protection to employees. "a
For their part, state courts have created public policy exceptions to the atwill rule and, in some cases, have allowed actions for wrongful discharge
based upon violation of these statutes. 'I What legislatures and courts have
not done, despite every opportunity, is replace the basic notion that
employers and employees are free to end the employment relationship at any
time and for virtually any reason with a rule that would allow a cause of
action based on something other than a violation of the worst forms of
employer behavior. Despite predictions that employment at-will would cease
to exist by the end of the twentieth century,'" the doctrine lives on, albeit in
a modified version."s This failure to act in the face of repeated entreaties
suggests that the modern version of the employment at-will rule is the way it
is because courts and legislatures want it to be that way. Whether the reason
is complicated economic rationales, simple fear of change, interest group
influence, or a combination of all of the above, the fact is that these lawmaking entities are unwilling to take from employers the freedom to
discharge their employees as they see fit, except when the discharge affects
interests apart from those of the parties involved.

161. Id. at 1666.
162. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT § 659.550 (1998) (prohibiting retaliation against employees

who report criminal activity).
163. See, e.g., West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (1999).
164. St. Antoine, supra note 157, at 81 (writing in 1988 that "[w]hether it will be in the
coming decade or the following, we shall shortly see on the legal landscape only the decaying husk
of the doctrine of employment at will.").

165. Okediji, supra note 145, at 57-58 ("Although the legitimacy of the at-will doctrine as an
expression of American law has faced some challenge, the rule nonetheless continues to thrive as a
cardinal principle of employment relations."); William R. Corbett, The -Fall- of Summers, the
Rise of "Pretejt Plus, - and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination
Law to Employment at Wil: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REv. 305, 308 (1996)
("Employment at will now has won so many battles before the Supreme Court that the war may

almost be over.").
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B. Judicial Treatment of Interference Claims in the At-Will Setting
These concerns over the relative advantages and disadvantages of at-will
employment relationships and more formal employment contracts have their
roots in basic contract law. Simply stated, the law does give more protection
to parties who have memorialized their agreements as to their respective
rights and obligations into formal contract form. When the parties have
limited their ability to terminate a contract and have specifically laid out
those limitations, the law provides protection. Parties who merely aspire to
enter into a contract or who have a relationship lacking such limitations
correspondingly lack the same type of protection because they have greater
freedom of action.
This basic premise of contract law is reflected in the distinction between
tortious interference with contractual relations and its more amorphous
cousin, interference with business relations. The authors of the Second
Restatement were clear on this point. The comments note that greater
protection should be afforded to existing contracts than for prospective ones,
"due in part to the greater definiteness of the [parties'] expectancy and [their]
stronger claim to security" in existing contracts.'" "As a result permissible
interference is given a broader scope" in the case of business relations or
prospective contractual relations than in the case of existing, formal
contracts. 6
Thus, formalized contracts are valued more highly in
interference law than are prospective contractual relations or business
relations.
Not only does the law value contracts more highly than mere
expectancies, it values contracts which are capable of being terminated only
under specified conditions more highly than it does contracts terminable atwill. Some have questioned whether interference with a terminable at-will
contract should be actionable under an interference with contract theory,
because when a party terminates such a contract, there has been no breach.
As such, it is impossible for an outsider to have induced a breach as the tort
requires. " Although stating that contracts terminable at will are nonetheless
valid and subsisting contracts until terminated,' 69 the Second Restatement
suggests that terminable at-will contracts might be entitled to less protection
than enforceable contracts. The comments provide that one's interest in a
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 767 cmt. e (1977).
167. Id. cmt. j; see aLso KEETON supra note 25, § 129, at 996 (noting the "correspondingly
greater freedom of action on the defendant's part" in the case of a contract at-will).
168. Francis Bowes Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 701-02
(1923).
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. g (1977).
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contract terminable at-will is primarily an interest in future relations between
the parties and that one has no legal assurance of them."? As a result, such
contracts are "closely analogous" to mere prospective contractual
relationships, which receive less protection from outside interference.""
In this sense, interference law parallels the modem version of
employment at-will. Given the huge importance to any individual of holding
a steady job, the modem formulation of employment at-will provides
employees with some measure of protection from unjust dismissals; however,
at-will employees are not entitled to the same level of protection as are
Similarly, the
employees under most collective bargaining agreements.
Second Restatement is clear that prospective contractual relations or business
relations are entitled to some measure of protection from outside
interference, but that they are not entitled the same protection as existing
contracts. Furthermore, the comments provide that contracts terminable at
will closely resemble business relationships not reduced to formal contract
form. In sum, there is ample support for the notion that as the degree of
enforceability of a relationship decreases, the extent of permissible
interference by an outsider increases."
Therefore, the classification of employment at-will relationships matters
for purposes of an interference theory. Given the realities of an at-will
employment relationship, it is appropriate to afford them less protection from
interference than definite-term contracts. Although courts and commentators
often refer to employment at-will relationships as at-will employment
contracts, they are contracts of a particularly tenuous nature.'" Clearly,
modem employment law views them as deserving of protection, but not
nearly to the extent that it protects the parties' interests in employment
contracts for a fixed term or contracts containing just cause provisions. Of
course, the fact that the parties themselves cannot insist on performance
should not mean that such relationships are terminable at the will of others. 7
However, because employers and employees have no more than a future
170.

Id.

171. Id.; see also id. § 766B cmt. b.
172. Duggin v. Adams, 360 S.E.2d 832, 836 (Va. 1987); Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc.,
413 N.E.2d 98, 102 (I1. App. Ct. 1980).
173. Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D. Nev. 1993) (stating that although
theoretically governed by contract law, at-will employment relationships are not a contract with
which a third party can interfere).
174. For a defense of the position that interferences with at-will employment relationships
should be viewed within the interference with contractual relations paradigm, see Bochnowski v.
Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 571 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind. 1991) ("The parties in an employment
at will relationship have no less of an interest in the integrity and security of their contract than do
the parties in any other type of contractual relationship.").
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expectancy in, rather than a legal right to, the continuation of the
relationship, at-will relationships are rightfully deserving of less
protection." To do otherwise would be to elevate at-will relationships to a
level beyond what both the default rule of employment at-will and the Second
Restatement's view on interference claims call for. As such, interferences
with at-will employment relationships are better classified as interferences
with terminable at-will contracts or business relations with the greater
attendant freedom to interfere.
If such relationships are entitled to less protection from outside
interference, then the next question that emerges is how much protection
from outside interference are at-will employees entitled to? Here, the Second
Restatement is less than clear. Although the Second Restatement specifically
notes that defendants enjoy a greater latitude to interfere with such
relationships, the fact specific nature of such claims and the flexible sevenfactor test for determining whether an interference is improper make
articulation of a hard and fast rule difficult.
Despite the Second Restatement's instruction that an outsider enjoys
greater freedom to interfere with a prospective contractual relation, most
courts have failed to draw any meaningful distinction between the freedoms
to interfere in these situations. Some courts acknowledge that the at-will
nature of the employment relationship is not a bar to an interference claim,
but rarely is there a mention of the greater permissible scope of interference
in such cases."16 As a result, no clear standard for analysis has developed.
C. What All of This Means in Practice
The end result is a system in which two bodies of law-wrongful
discharge law and tortious interference-are in tension, despite their
similarities.
Both claims involve "improper" or "wrongful" action,
ultimately attributable to the employer, that leads to the end of the
employment relationship. Indeed, a discharge that is "wrongful" in the sense
that it violates public policy or offends an anti-discrimination law will most

175. For a defense of this position, see King v. Sioux City Radiological Group, 985 F. Supp.
869, 882-85 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (explaining why, under Iowa law, interferences with at-will
employment relationships are treated as interferences with prospective contractual advantage).
176. Compare Hall v. Integon Life Ins. Co., 454 So. 2d 1338, 1344 (Ala. 1984) (holding that
an at-will employee may state a tortious interference claim but failing to note any distinction
between the theories of interference with contractual relations and business relations) with King,
985 F. Supp. at 882-85 (noting the greater protection given to definite-term contracts).
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likely also be "improper" under an interference theory.'" As such, it is not
uncommon to see an interference claim added onto a complaint, either in
addition to or in place of a wrongful discharge claim. 78
Despite the similarities between the theories, tortious interference claims
have the potential to undercut the employment at-will rule. To use David
Gergen's term, interference claims lie "deeply in the shadow" of the
employment at-will rule.'" Indeed, one of the most famous formulations of
the at-will rule comes from the 1884 case of Payne v. Western & Atlantic
Railroad,"' a case brought by a merchant under a tortious interference with
contract theory.'' One of the fundamental premises of tortious interference
claims is that a party cannot be held liable for interfering with a contract or
relationship to which it is a party."s

The reality of the workplace is that, in

most cases, a corporate employer's act of firing an employee is accomplished
through use of an intermediary, most often a supervisor or officer. Thus,
although it is the employer who officially fires the employee, it is usually a
supervisor or officer who does the actual act of firing. Employment at-will
allows an employer to fire an employee for nearly any reason. Thus, if a
supervisor can be held liable under an interference theory for discharging an
employee based solely out of personal animosity, an employer's freedom to
discharge its employees is undercut by an interference theory and the default
rule is weakened. Stated another way, by imposing liability on an officer or
supervisor for a discharge motivated by an improper purpose, courts come
close to establishing a standard requiring an employer to have just cause to
terminate." s Assuming that an "improper" discharge would also fail to meet
a just cause standard, the only difference between the two standards is that
the employer is not directly held liable under the former. However, because
177. See, e.g., Nelson v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 949 F. Supp. 254, 260-61 (D. Del. 1996) (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss an interference claim where plaintiff alleged that her supervisor had
acted, in part, because of plaintiff's race and gender).
178. Supra notes 39, 40 and accompanying text; Gergen supra note 11, at 1196.
179. Gergen, supra note 11. at 1179, 1197-98.
180. 81 Tenn. 507 (1884).
181. According to the Tennessee Supreme Court:
[M]en must be left.., to buy and sell where they please, and to discharge or
retain employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause
without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se ... All may dismiss
their employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or
even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of a legal wrong.
Id. at 518-20. For an interesting discussion of the history of Payne, see Morriss, supra note 154, at
683 n.l1.
182. See, e.g., Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir. 1996).
183. Halvorsen v. Aramark Unif. Svcs., Inc., 65 Cal. App. 4th 1383, 1396 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
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the employer can only act through its agents, the employer's freedom is,
nonetheless, restricted. It is for this reason that some courts have been
reluctant to allow interference claims premised upon a firing by a

supervisor,'
often being unconcerned about the possibility that the
supervisor may have acted from personal motives, apart from serving the
employer.'
However, as detailed above, such claims, although far from
routine and certainly not always successful, are now recognized as
potentially viable in most jurisdictions."at
The earlier example from Pauline Kim's study provides a clear illustration
of how interference claims can intrude on the at-will rule. Kim administered
a written survey to over 330 unemployed workers in the St. Louis area in an
attempt to gauge their knowledge as to the employment at-will rule.' s' Kim
asked applicants whether it was lawful for an employer to fire an employee if
the reason for the firing was "personal dislike."' Eighty-nine percent of the
respondents believed that the law forbids such a discharge.' Although most
employment law practitioners would conclude without hesitation that these
respondents are incorrect, interference case law proves that the respondents
are, in fact, correct. If a supervisor discharges an employee solely out of
184. Halvorsen, 65 Cal. App. 4th at 1396 (granting supervisors an absolute privilege to
terminate an at-will employee and justifying the privilege on the right of employers to discharge
employees under the employment at-will rule); West v. Troelstrup, 367 So. 2d 253, 255 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979) (refusing to recognize an interference claim against a supervisor where it was
undisputed that the supervisor had the authority to fire the plaintiff); Eggleston v. Phillips, 838
S.W.2d 80, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that an interference is justified if the interfering party
has a legal right to do so and holding that because an employer had a legal right to discharge for
any reason and because a corporation acts through its agents, a supervising employee with the
power to fire has a legal right to take these actions is justified in discharging an employee);
Wampler v. Palmerton, 439 P.2d 601, 606 (Or. 1968) (explaining that corporate officers have a
privilege to terminate employment due to the right of the corporation to do so); see also Gergen,
supra note 11, at 1197-98.
185. Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 250 S.E.2d 442, 444 (Ga. 1978) (stating that if a district
manager had the absolute right to discharge employee, he could not be a third party); Fletcher v.
Wesley Med. Ctr., 585 F. Supp. 1260, 1262 (D. Kan. 1984) (noting that it was "quite immaterial"
that the defendant may have acted out of personal motives in firing the plaintiff); Martin v. Platt,
386 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming summary judgment in favor of individual
supervisors on the grounds that, because the decision to discharge the plaintiff rested with the
supervisors, the supervisors acted within the scope of their duty); Pinnix v. Babcock & Wilcox,
Inc., 689 F. Supp. 634, 637 (N.D. Miss. 1988) (applying Mississippi law and holding as a matter
of law that superiors did not tortiously interfere with employment relationship, because "[c]hoosing
to terminate an at-will employee, even if based on personal animosity, would not have exceeded"
their supervisory responsibilities); Eggleston, 838 S.W.2d at 82 (stating that whatever the motives
of the supervisors, they were justified in discharging plaintiff).
186. Supra Part II.B.
187. Kim, supra note 2, at 110.
188. Id. at 134.
189. Id. at 134.
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personal dislike or ill will, the supervisor may very well be held liable under
an interference theory.'
In effect, tortious interference claims revoke an
employer's "license to be mean."' 9'
One logical response to this observation might be that the interference
torts impose some higher threshold of proof of wrongfulness other than mere
personal dislike. However, neither the Second Restatement nor the caselaw
supports such a conclusion."9 Courts use a bewildering array of synonyms
("in bad faith," "with malice," "with actual malice," "out of spite," "out of
personal hostility" or "intentionally" to name a few) to describe the type of
bad motive that will render an interference wrongful.'" Although some
courts take the time to clarify what they mean by the use of the term
"malice," the offending synonym is often used as a generalized expression of
"meanness."
Another logical response to this assertion is that although an individual
supervisor may be held liable, the central premise of the employment at-will
rule is left undisturbed - the supervisor may be liable for such action, but not
the employer. However, there are several opinions that have, in fact, been
willing to hold the employer liable for the improper interference of a
supervisor under a respondeatsuperior theory.'" If a discharge is wrongful
in the sense that it is actionable under wrongful discharge law, then it will
almost certainly also be improper.'" However, an improper interference is
not necessarily wrongful under wrongful discharge law. In at least one case,
an employer has been held vicariously liable under an interference theory for
behavior on the part of a supervisor which would not serve as the basis of a
wrongful discharge claim.'
These types of outcomes plainly turn an
190. Supra notes 99-100 and cases cited therein.
191. Supra note 53 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Barker v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 524 S.E. 2d 821, 826 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)
(fmding a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether supervisor improperly interfered with
plaintiff's employment relationship where evidence existed that supervisor acted out of personal
hostility). According to the comments in the Second Restatement, if the defendant's sole motive is
to injure the plaintiff or to vent his ill will on the plaintiff, the interference "is almost certain to be
held improper." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. d (1977).
193. Supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text; see also Gergen, supra note 11, at 1183-84.
194. Bemstein v. Aetna Life & Cas., 843 F.2d 359, 367 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing employee
to proceed under an interference theory against the employee's corporate employer based upon an
allegedly improper interference by the employee's supervisor); Cappiello v. Ragen Precision
Indus., 471 A.2d 432, 437 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (upholding liability against a
corporate employer, apparently based on the "malicious interference" on the part of the corporate
president and a supervisor); Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Standard Pump-Aldrich Div., 422 A.2d 611,
625 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (holding that vicarious liability may be imposed on an employer for the
improper interference of another employee).
195. Supra note 177 and accompanying text.
196. Yaindl, 422 A.2d at 621, 625.

33:0491

Tortious Interference Claims In The Employment Context

529

interference theory on its head and convert an employment at-will
relationship into a just cause standard.97 Admittedly, these opinions are few
and far between. The fact remains, though, that precedent exists for holding
employers liable for interfering with their own business relationships because
their agents behaved in a manner that wrongful discharge law allows, a result
which is seemingly impossible under the employment at-will rule and tortious
interference theory.
Even when these aberrant decisions are removed from the equation, the
unavoidable conclusion is that interference claims represent an inviting and
gaping detour around the employment at-will rule and a means of escaping
the long shadow that the rule casts. Under the at-will rule, no claim will lie
against the employer even if the discharge was "malicious or done for other
improper reasons, " "g so long as it does not otherwise offend some existing
public policy. Yet, if supervisors and officers can be liable for improperly
causing the discharge of employees based solely on a showing of malice
unrelated to any protected characteristic of the employee, an interference
claim makes illegal a discharge which is not wrongful under wrongful
discharge law. In other words, tortious interference claims create a cause of
action for malicious termination of at-will employment against a supervisor
which is almost indistinguishable from imposing a just cause standard for
termination on employers.'99
Of course, critics of the modern formulation of the at-will rule might
applaud such a result. One need not take a side in the debate as to the rule's
desirability to have concern over such an outcome. The employment at-will
rule exists. Whether that is a good thing or a bad thing is beside the point.
Because it exists, courts should give effect to the rule. The modem version
of the rule seeks to strike a balance between protecting an employer's
freedom to run its business free from intermeddling and protecting
employees from discharges that strike at public policy concerns. The result
is that courts are not called upon to serve as "super-personnel departments
reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business judgments made by
employers, except to the extent that those judgments involve intentional
197. Clement v. Rev-Lyn Contracting Co., 663 N.E.2d 1235, 1236 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct.

1996).
198. Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708, 709 (Ala. 1978).
199. Halvorsen v. Aramark Unif. Serv., Inc., 77 CaI.Rptr. 2d 383, 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998);
see also Huff v.Swartz, 606 N.W.2d 461, 469 (Neb. 2000) (stating that proof of malice, standing
alone, is generally insufficient to establish an improper interference by a manager because "[tlo
hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the fact that Nebraska law does not recognize a cause of
action for malicious termination of at-will employment.") (citing White v. Adam, Inc., 430 N.W.2d
27 (1988)).
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As a result, discharge

decisions that are objectively unfair, but not discriminatory or that do not
cross the blurry line into "wrongfulness," remain legal. Decisions which
push the line in one direction or the other infringe on the default rule of
employment at-will.
None of which is to say that interference claims against supervisors or
officers should never be permitted. As the Supreme Court stated nearly a
century ago, "[t]he fact that the employment is at the will of the parties,
respectively, does not make it one at the will of others.""' However, when
it comes to deciding whether supervisors and officers are truly "others," it is
not always clear how the Court's statement should apply. Put another way,
the difficulty comes in attempting to devise a framework that takes into
account the realities of the modem workplace; namely, that at-will
employees do have some degree of interest in their jobs and should be
protected from malicious behavior, but that corporate employers must
delegate the authority for firing to individual supervisors and that, by human
nature, not all discharges are motivated purely by a desire to benefit only the
employer.'
The reality is that some supervisors do not like the people they
fire or that they hope to benefit themselves by firing an employee; the
modem exceptions to the at-will rule are not triggered in most of these cases.
The question is, under what circumstances should such firings be actionable
under a theory apart from wrongful discharge?
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Although the fact-specific and amorphous nature of interference claims
make easy answers to such questions difficult, courts can take steps to
prevent interference claims from overwhelming the at-will rule. The need to
200. Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) ("Courts are generally less competent than
employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should
not attempt it."); Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting the
procedural safeguards afforded to employees but stating that to second guess the defendant's
decision to terminate the employee "'would severely hinder the rights of employers everywhere to
effectively control and manage their companies'" (citation omitted)); NLRB v. Fla. Steel Corp.,
586 F.2d 436, 444 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Neither Board nor Court can second-guess [management] or
give it gentle guidance by over-the-shoulder-supervision." (quoting NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d
406 (5th Cir. 1956)); Halvorsen, 77 Cal.Rptr. 2d, at 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (granting managers
an absolute privilege to discharge and justifying the decision on the grounds of preventing
disruption of the business enterprise through judicial inquiry into the motives of managers).
201. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38 (1915).
202. Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Davis, 687 F.2d 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1982).
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do so is obvious: employment at-will is the umbrella rule for employment
relationships that oversees all other rules. The trick is to craft an approach
that is in keeping with the limited exceptions to the modem exceptions to the
at-will, but which also allows for claims based on supervisor or officer
behavior that is beyond the pale.
A. Giving Effect to the At-Will Rule
The first step in tightening up the disconnect between interference theory
and employment at-will is recognizing the possible effect that interference
claims can have on the justifications behind the at-will rule. Here, I borrow
from David Gergen's approach to dealing with an interference claim that
"lies deeply in the shadow of another body of law."'
Gergen would allow
an interference claim in a case that lies deeply in a different "legal
cubbyhole" only if the plaintiff can demonstrate that there "is some unusual
interest or factor present ...that the other body of law does not address."'
Where the other body of law reflects a conscious decision to exclude a
particular kind of claim from within its rubric, an interference claim brought
as a means of escaping the other body of law should be denied. Gergen
provides as an example an interference claim brought by an employee against
an ex-employer who "filed a civil suit charging the plaintiff with
misappropriating trade secrets in order to induce the employee's [new
employer] to fire him."2
Assuming the employer had probable cause to
institute the suit and that the employer made no demands of the plaintiff in
filing the suit, no actions for malicious prosecution or abuse of process will
lie. 2
An interference claim would at first seem a viable alternative.
However, Gergen argues that an interference claim should not lie in such a
case because the other body of law, abuse of process, is guarded closely by
courts in order to protect a party's interest in resorting to law.'
Allowing
an interference claim in such a case would adversely affect that interest.8
As such, unless the plaintiff can distinguish his case from the general rule
that it is not tortious to file a suit merely to harass someone, the court should
not allow the interference claim to proceed.'

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Gergen, supra note 11, at 1179, 1197-98.
Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1221-22.
Id. at 1222.
Id.
Id. at 1221-23.
Id. at 1223.

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. LTJ

Following Gergen's approach would provide courts with a basis for
handling interference claims in the employment at-will setting. Instead of
considering in a vacuum the question of whether the interference of a
supervisor or officer was improper, a court's analysis should be informed by
the justifications for the current status of the at-will rule. To a certain
extent, courts already look to an existing body of law, namely defamation, in
interference cases involving employment references. As mentioned, courts
frequently apply the privileges developed in defamation cases to interference
claims based on negative references. 2" ° In the case of a supervisor or officer
who brings about an employee's termination, if permitting an employee's
interference claim to proceed would intrude on the balance struck by modern
wrongful discharge law, the claim should be denied. Where the behavior of
the supervisor or officer is of a nature similar to that which would be
actionable under a wrongful discharge theory, or if the balance struck by
modem wrongful discharge law would not be affected, the claim should be
allowed. The court's decision would necessarily look to the purposes
underlying the modem version of the at-will rule and to specific examples of
behavior that are actionable under a wrongful discharge theory. Specifically,
it would focus on the means used to accomplish the interference and the
motives of the officers or supervisor only where such motives would be
unlawful under existing wrongful discharge theories.
Section 767 of the Second Restatement already provides the tools that
would help inform a court's decision when a supervisor or officer is alleged
to have interfered with an at-will relationship. As mentioned, some courts
focus on the defendant's motive or the interests advanced by the defendant in
assessing whether an interference is improper, almost to the exclusion of the
other five factors contained in section 767." However, the other factors
play an important role, and several of the factors directly implicate the
balancing test which currently exists in the workplace. Despite the factspecific nature of interference claims, the analysis of several of the factors
will nearly always be a constant.

210. Supra Part III.B.3. Courts are frequently less than rigorous in their attempts to explain
outcomes in these cases. As mentioned, there is a split of authority concerning whether truth is an
absolute defense to an interference claim. Supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. Despite the
obvious constitutional issues raised by holding that truth is not a defense in such cases and the
implications of such a rule for existing defamation principles, few courts have discussed these issues
in any detail, no matter what their ultimate decision. Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 506
S.E.2d 578, 593 (W. Va. 1998) (noting the failure of courts to explain their reasoning in these
cases).
211. Supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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One of the factors to consider is the interest of the plaintiff with which the
defendant interferes.212 In the case of an at-will employee, the employee's
interest is of a lesser nature than that of an employee laboring under a
collective bargaining agreement or other form of employment contract. 2 3 A
court should start under the assumption, expressed in the Second
Restatement, that the permissible level of interference by an outsider
increases as the level of enforceability of the relationship decreases. 2 "4 As
this assumption mirrors the employment at-will rule itself, the bar for
deeming an interference improper should naturally be raised slightly in the
case of any interference with an employment at-will relationship.
Another factor to consider is the relation between the parties.21 s The
comments note that "the significant relationship may be between any two of
the three [relevant] parties. "216 Thus, the fact that the defendant and the
party who ends the relationship enjoy a close relationship might tend to make
an otherwise improper interference proper. 27 Therefore, the fact that an
officer or supervisor occupies a close relationship with the employer by
virtue of his position is another factor which should justify a higher threshold
for at-will plaintiffs. Further support for this view can be found in the
comment concerning the relations between the parties, which notes that the
at-will nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the other party to
the relationship may be important to the determination.1 '
Section 767 also provides that "the proximity or remoteness of the
[defendant's] conduct to the interference" should be taken into account.219
The comments provide that the other factors contained in section 767 "need
not play as important a role" if termination of the relationship is a direct
consequence of the defendant's inducement of the termination.'
However,
in many cases, an officer or supervisor will have the power to directly
terminate the relationship. In essence, the only way a corporate employer
could not be induced or caused to terminate the relationship in such an
example is if someone else higher up in the corporate hierarchy decided to
overrule the discharge decision. As such, there is a certain conceptual
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767(c) (1977).
213. Supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. j (1977) ('permissible interference is
given a broader scope" in the instance of interference with the interest of acquiring prospective
contractual relations); see also supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767(g) (1977).
216. Id. § 767 cmt. i.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. § 767(f).
220. Id. § 767 cmt. h.
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anomaly in claiming that a supervisor induced the breach of the employment
contract - a supervisor vested with the power to fire does not so much induce
a termination of the relationship as he actually terminates the relationship. " !
As such, holding the proximity of causation against the supervisor or officer
would be to ignore the realities of a corporation.
Section 767 also notes that "the social interests in protecting the freedom
of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other" is an
important factor.m Here, the modem version of the at-will rule casts a long
shadow. The modem at-will rule has already taken these competing interests
into account and arrived at a rough balance: employees have an interest in
being free from discriminatory or retaliatory discharges, but employers
remain free to discharge employees for other, less pernicious reasons. Thus,
an employer's freedom to act takes precedence over an employee's interest
unless the supervisor or officer is motivated by an unlawful purpose. This
balance makes consideration of a supervisor's motives or the interests sought
to be advanced relevant only where the supervisor seeks to advance an
unlawful interest or is motivated by discriminatory animus. Any outcome in
an interference case involving an at-will employee and a supervisor or officer
that would punish behavior not motivated by such purposes tips the balance
struck by the at-will rule and should be rejected.
However, an employee who is discharged by an officer or supervisor
would not necessarily be without a remedy against the officer or supervisor.
Section 767 also lists "the nature of the [defendant's] conduct" as a factor to
consider.' Under the Second Restatement, the use of certain means (such as
"violence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and threats of illegal conduct") to
accomplish an otherwise lawful end may subject the defendant to liability.'
221. For example, in one case involving a supervisor's decision to terminate the plaintiff's
employment, the court noted:
[The employee] argues that the only parties to [the] employment relationship were
[the employee and the company] .... [The supervisor] was the person through whom
[the company] acted in dismissing [the employee]... . If [the supervisor] was a third
party, who did he induce to terminate [the employee]? There is no allegation that
[the supervisor] influenced or induced anyone to terminate [the employee]. It appears
that the only person who could have been induced to terminate [the employee] was
[the supervisor] himself.
West v. Troelstrup, 367 So. 2d 253, 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); see aLso Willcox v. Boeing
Military Airplane Co., No. 87-1015-C, 1989 WL 107728, at *8 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 1989)
(dismissing claim against supervisor who forced plaintiff to quit because plaintiff was seeking to
give "two hats to a single cause of action - an agent of the employer and a third party acting in a
tortious manner").
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767(e) (1977).
223. Id. § 767(a).
224. Id. § 767 cmt. c.
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Thus, although a defendant may be legally entitled to produce a particular
result, he is not entitled to accomplish the result by the use of otherwise
illegal or wrongful conduct.
,
Here, the underlying justifications for the employment at-will rule are not
seriously threatened. Wrongful discharge law is concerned only with limiting
an employer's freedom to advance a harmful interest.m It is silent on the
issue of the means used by the employer to carry out that interest. Instead,
tort law serves as the limitation on an employer's freedom to carry out an
otherwise legal discharge in an unlawful fashion. For example, because an
employer has a legal right to discharge an employee for nearly any reason,
the simple act of discharging an employee is generally not grounds for an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

6

However, where the

employer employs extreme or outrageous means to force the employee to
quit or effectuates the firing in an outrageous manner, the at-will status of the
relationship does not serve as a bar.m' Therefore, allowing an interference
claim to proceed in the case of a supervisor or officer who has used improper
means to accomplish the interference would not seriously impinge on the atwill rule.
The idea that a court should make the nature of the interference the
dispositive element in the case of an interference with a prospective
contractual relation or business relation already has some support. A few
courts already require the showing of improper means on the part of the
defendant in other types of interference cases. 2 For example, in Duggin v.
225. See, e.g., DeJarnette v. Coming Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Our sole
concern is 'whether the reason for which the defendant discharged the plaintiff was
discriminatory.'").
226. Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment At Will:
The Case Against the 'Tortification' of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387, 395-96
(1994). However, where the employer is motivated by discriminatory animus, the discharge may
be wrongful. Id. at 398-99 (discussing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in this
context). Part of the justification for this outcome comes from the Second Restatement's position
on intentional infliction of emotional distress. The comments note that an employer's power over
an employee may make actions, which if committed by a stranger would be lawful, unlawful when
committed by an employer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1977). A similar
sentiment is expressed in the Second Restatement's comments on tortious interference. Section 767
provides that "the proximity or remoteness of the [defendant's] conduct" should be taken into
account when considering whether the interference was improper. Id. § 767(f).
227. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 218-19 (Cal. 1970) (holding that
plaintiff stated a cause of action where a superintendent shouted at plaintiff, used racial slurs, and
then fired plaintiff).
228. NBT Bancorp, Inc. v. Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 492, 497 (N.Y. 1996)
(involving allegedly tortious interference by a business competitor); Duggin v. Adams, 360 S.E.2d
832, 836 (Va. 1987) (involving allegedly tortious interference by an attorney in a real estate deal).
See generally Speakers of Sport, Inc. v. Proserv, Inc., 178 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1999) ('[The
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Adams , 2 the Virginia Supreme Court held that when a contract is terminable
at will, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant employed "improper
methods" in order to state a prima facie case. 23 According to the court,
examples of the use of improper methods could include those "that are illegal
or independently tortious," violations of "an established standard of a trade
sharp dealing, overreaching, or unfair competition.'231 In
or profession ....
the case of business competition, the rule represents a balance struck between
"society's interest in respect for the integrity of contractual relationships, on
the one hand, and, on the other, the right to freedom of action on the part of
the party interfering and society's concern that competition not be unduly
hampered. "2 In other cases involving interferences with at-will contracts or
business relations, the rule represents a recognition that the parties' interests
are merely an expectancy in future economic gain and that, unlike a definiteterm contract, they have no legal assurance that they will recognize the
gain." These same rationales apply to interference with at-will employment
relationships.
Similarly, in a 1982 law review article, Harvey S. Perlman advanced an
efficiency-based argument in support of his view that interference claims
should be limited to cases in which the defendant's acts are independently
unlawful.'4 According to Perlman, a defendant's improper motive should
only give rise to liability where there is objective indicia that the activity
produces social loss." Perlman argues that motive is an imperfect indicator
For one, proof of motivation is error prone.237 For
of wrongfulness.'
another, a bad motive does not necessarily produce a socially undesirable
Perlman provides as an example a case in which the interfering
result."
party, motivated by personal animosity towards one of the parties to a
contract, seeks out a more advantageous opportunity for the other party and
tort of interference with business relationships should be confined to cases in which the defendant
employed unlawful means to stiff a competitor." (citations omitted)); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co.
v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 307 (Utah 1982) ("Problems inherent in proving motivation or purpose
make it prudent for commercial conduct to be regulated for the most part by the improper means
alternative, which typically requires only a showing of particular conduct.").
229. 360 S.E.2d 832 (Va. 1987).
230. Duggin, 360 S.E.2d at 836 (citations omitted).
231. Id. at 836-37.
232. NBT Bancorp., 664 N.E.2d at 496 (quoting Guard-Life Corp. v. Parker Hardware Mtg.
Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1980)).
233. Duggin, 360 S.E.2d at 836.
234. Perlman, supra note 24, at 97.
235. Id. at 98.
236. Id. at 95.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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induces the other party to breach the contract. 9 The result is an efficient
breach which produces a social benefit.m Moreover, Perlman argues, proof
of malice is unnecessary where the defendant's acts are independently
tortious." Motive only plays a role under Perlman's formulation where the
defendant's actions are otherwise lawful, but work at cross purposes with the
objective of efficient allocation of resources.'a
Perlman's theory fits neatly into the approach I describe above with only
minimal explanation. The most common justification for the modem version
of employment at-will is that it is the most efficient method of governing the
employment relationship. Obviously, there will be unjust, arbitrary, and just
plain stupid discharge decisions under the rule that are counterproductive to
the notion of efficiency. Even if one rejects the efficiency-based arguments
of Epstein and Posner that economic realities limit the frequency of such
discharges, modern wrongful discharge law, whether purposefully or not,
has determined that it is an inefficient use of judicial resources to inquire into
the motives of employers, except where the wrong alleged clearly has
implications for society as a whole.
Motive would not be irrelevant under this formulation, however. Instead,
it could potentially factor into the analysis at two points. First, a court
necessarily has to consider the supervisor's motives and the interests sought
to be advanced by the supervisor at the outset of the case in order to
determine whether the supervisor is an outside party. If the supervisor acts,
at least in part, to advance the employer's interests, then the supervisor is not
a third party to the relationship and cannot be liable. 3 If the supervisor acts
for reasons unrelated to advancing the employer's interest, then he is an
outside party and may be sued.'
Second, it might be necessary to consider
the supervisor's motive where advancement of that motive is illegal under
existing wrongful discharge law.
The end result is a framework for analysis which protects an existing
default rule and can be applied in a relatively easy fashion by courts. In
cases where an officer or supervisor of an employer is alleged to have
intentionally interfered with an at-will employee's relationship with the
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 96.
242. Id. at 98.
243. Supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
244. Of course, the fact that the defendant acts in an unlawful or outrageous manner may also
be evidence that the defendant was not actuated by an intent to perform the corporation's business,
i.e., that the defendant acted solely out of personal interests. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 235 cmt. c (1957).
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employer by causing the employee's discharge, the interference would be
improper where the officer or supervisor acted outside the scope of
employment and through the use of improper means. Because four of the
seven factors contained in section 767 (the employee's interest in the
relationship, the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the
defendant and the contractual interests of the employee, the proximity or
remoteness of the defendant's conduct to the interference, and the relations
between the parties) will almost always be a constant in the case of an officer
or supervisor with supervisory authority over an at-will employee, these
factors need no separate consideration. Two of the factors, the defendant's
motive and the interests sought to be advanced by the defendant, are relevant
under a wrongful discharge theory only where the motives and interests are
discriminatory or otherwise in contravention of public policy. As to permit
an interference claim where the reason for the discharge is not actionable
under a wrongful discharge theory would be to undercut the default rule of
employment at-will, an interference should not be improper based on motive
alone unless the discharge would otherwise be actionable under existing
employment laws. Finally, if the conduct of the officer or supervisor that
causes the discharge is both outside the scope of employment and
independently wrongful, then the interference should be held improper.
B. The Approach Illustrated
A quick look at a recent case involving an interference claim brought
against supervisory personnel helps illustrate the benefits of this approach.
Barker v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,' is a run-of-the-mill case from an
intermediate appellate court in North Carolina. In Barker, an employee's
supervisor accused the employee in front of both managers and nonmanagers of taking illegal drugs on the company's premises and accessing
pornography on the Internet on a company computer.'s In addition, the
employee alleged that her name appeared on her supervisor's "hit list with
names of employees he intended to get rid of" and that her supervisor had
admitted to her his desire to terminate her employment.24 7 After being
discharged, the employee brought claims of slander per se and tortious
interference with contractual rights.'
She denied the supervisor's drug
charges and alleged that, not only had she not accessed pornography, she
245.
246.
247.
248.

524 S.E.2d 821 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 823-25.
Id. at 827.
Id. at 823, 826.

33:0491

Tortious Interference Claims In The Employment Context

539

was not on company premises on the night she was accused of the offense.39
The appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the supervisor, finding that the facts raised a genuine issue of
matefial fact as to the supervisor's motives.35 Under the approach described
above, the court should reach the same result, but for different reasons.
First, the opinion, like some others, confuses the questions of scope of
employment and privilege (or proper behavior). The supervisor argued that
he could not be liable under an interference theory because, as a manager, he
was a "non-outsider" to the plaintiff's employment contract. s In other
words, the supervisor was arguing that he was not a third party to the
employment relationship. The court, however, held that "non-outsider status
is pertinent only to the question of whether the defendant's action was
justified."'
This is simply wrong as a matter of law. However, the court
did, arguably, reach the correct result in holding that the supervisor was
amenable to such a claim. If a supervisor acts solely for personal interests,
rather than in the interests of the company, then the supervisor becomes a
third party.253 As there is no mention of any other possible motive on the
part of the supervisor apart from ill-will and personal hostility, the plaintiff
could potentially prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
supervisor was a third party to the relationship and amenable to suit.
The analysis should not end there, however. The court's opinion follows
the approach of most courts. Once it is determined that the supervisor acted
out of personal hostility, none of the other factors listed in section 767 enter
into the picture and there is a finding of improper interference. The Barker
opinion is silent on the question of other possible motives on the part of the
supervisor. However, it is at least plausible that some proper motive did
exist alongside the improper motives.
The supervisor's "hit list" of
employees he wanted to get rid of could have been prompted by poor
performance just as easily as personal animosity unrelated to performance.
Without further facts, it is impossible to say; however, there is no indication
from the opinion that the supervisor was motivated by any reason that would

be unlawful under wrongful discharge theory. As such, the supervisor's
personal animosity could not serve as the sole basis of an interference claim.
Despite the fact that the supervisor's motives, standing alone, could not
convert the discharge into a wrongful interference, the plaintiff should still
be able to reach a jury on her claim. The employment at-will rule prevents
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 826.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 826.
Id.
Supra Part lI.B.1.
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courts from serving as "super personnel departments," capable of secondguessing the reasons behind every discharge; it should not, however, be an
absolute defense which prevents a court from sanctioning behavior that is
wrongful for reasons separate and apart from the mere act of discharge. In
Barker, the supervisor allegedly accomplished the firing through slander. '
Although the supervisor may have had every right to discharge the employee
for personal reasons under the at-will rule, the fact that he accomplished his
goal through the use of slanderous allegations should result in a finding of
wrongful interference.

V. CONCLUSION

Depending upon one's perspective, the employment at-will rule is an
affront to decent society, an efficient and just means of regulating the
workplace, or something in between. Regardless of one's views, it is also
the default rule in forty-nine out of fifty states. 2'
In 1923, Francis Sayre warned that "[t]he limits of the tort are still so
undefined that there is a real danger that courts may unconsciously extend
them beyond their proper confines."2m In no area of the law does Sayre's
comment ring more true than in the field of employment law. As some
courts have recognized, tortious interference with business relations claims
against officers and supervisors carry with them the risk of engulfing the
employment at-will rule. 2" To prevent the default rule from being swept
aside by interference claims, courts need to restore some order to the
handling of such claims. The most logical place to start is by recognizing the
effect that interference claims may have on the default rule. After that,
courts can begin to put the focus on the means used by officers or
supervisors to accomplish their discharge decisions in an effort to both
protect the rights of employees and to remain true to existing law.
The employment at-will doctrine will undoubtedly continue to be the
focus of scholarly, legislative, and judicial debate, and it one day may come
254. The court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the
supervisor's comments were motivated by actual malice sufficient to defeat the qualified privilege
that would normally attach to such statements. Barker, 524 S.E.2d at 826-27. This is another
example of where the defendant's motivation might be relevant for purposes of an interference
claim. Supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text; see also Perlman, supra note 24, at 96 (stating
that where a defendant's actions are independently tortious, proof of malice is unnecessary except in
assessing the availability of punitive damages or where malice is an element of the independent
tort).
255. Supra note 159.
256. Sayre, supra note 168, at 702.
257. Supra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
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to pass that the doctrine will go the way of the dinosaurs. Until that day
comes, however, courts need to be mindful that, at least in theory, the rule
exists to prevent the exact type of judicial action that interference claims
against officers and supervisors call for.

